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Abstract
Aims
As it represents the final point of the whole rescue chain, hospital infrastructure is
one of the most important elements of medical response to earthquakes. In order to
correctly manage the emergency by providing the most efficient medical response,
it is fundamental to carry out a simple, rapid and reliable risk assessment of seismic
impact on hospitals. The purpose of this work was to develop a decision support
system for helping the decision makers with the seismic risk mitigation of health
structures.
Main Findings
A new integrated methodology was designed to identify vulnerabilities in the hospital
based on a combination of two main research approaches: the theory of complex
systems (input-output inoperability model of Leontief and the Fault Tree Analysis)
and the rapid seismic vulnerability assessment (field evaluation forms). After a first
risk assessment based on hospital safety and coping capacity at the OSMA Florence
Hospital, the model was validated with a real past event (L’Aquila earthquake in
2009, Italy) and, finally took into consideration the risk mitigation phase at the
Santa Clara Valley Medical Center in California, US.
The model application found out that the Leontieff model is less robust and reliable
than FTA especially for high seismic intensity scenarios. The risk mitigation phase
showed that the structural interventions (Florence at M=6 and US at M=8) did not
add any further appreciable improvements to the non-structural actions. Moreover,
the Italian hospital could provide a proper coping capacity by simultaneously ap-
plying fixing actions on both elements, basic installations and medical equipment.
While for the indirect measures (medical mobile unit installation and patients’ air
evacuation), the US case would need less external facilities and support than OSMA.
Conclusions
The results of the study serve as a support to decision makers for seismic risk mit-
igation of modern health structures (US and Europe case studies) by providing a
software prototype able to simulate the effects and evaluate the cost of applying
different retrofitting actions. Furthermore, the new approach took into account
both the strategic and sheltering functions of health structures by using quantita-
tive indices such as the HTC (Hospital Treatment Capacity) and the new index IS
(Intrinsic Security).
Riassunto (ITA)
Obiettivi
La struttura ospedaliera è uno degli elementi essenziali della risposta medica ter-
ritoriale durante un sisma in quanto rappresenta il punto finale della catena di
salvataggio. Al fine di pianificare e gestire correttamente l’emergenza, è quindi fon-
damentale effettuare una valutazione semplice, rapida ed affidabile del rischio sismico
che consideri anche, ma non solo, l’aspetto strategico e funzionale dell’ospedale. Lo
scopo di questo lavoro è stato quello di progettare un sistema di supporto decisionale
per fornire ai decisori ospedalieri le informazioni e le soluzioni interventistiche più
appropriate, inclusi i costi, per la riduzione del rischio sismico.
Principali risultati
Una nuova metodologia integrata è stata sviluppata per valutare il rischio sismico in
ospedale attraverso la combinazione di due principali approcci scientifici: la teoria
dei sistemi complessi e le metodologie relative alla valutazione rapida. Dopo una
prima applicazione metodologica effettuata presso l’ospedale di Firenze OSMA, il
modello è stato validato con un caso reale passato fornito dall’ospedale San Sal-
vatore delL’Aquila durante il terremoto del 2009. Infine, anche con l’obbiettivo di
coprire la più vasta gamma di ospedali moderni, il modello validato è stato applicato
ancora ad OSMA ed al Santa Clara Valley Medical Center (SCVMC) in California
negli Stati Uniti. Tra i principali risultati si ha che il modello di Leontieff risulta
essere è meno robusto ed affidabile rispetto all’analisi FTA, soprattutto per sce-
nari ad alta intensità sismica (I>8). La fase di riduzione del rischio sismico (I=6
OSMA e I=8 SCVMC) ha mostrato come tra gli interventi diretti, quelli strutturali
non aggiungano alcun miglioramento apprezzabile agli effetti forniti dalle azioni non
strutturali. Inoltre, l’ospedale italiano necessità di entrambe le azioni di retrofitting
non strutturale (impianti tecnici e tecnologie sanitarie) al contrario del centro amer-
icano che ne prevede solo una. Sulle misure indirette il SCVMC necessita di un
supporto esterno minore (circa metà) rispetto ad OSMA. Infine vista la maggiore
grandezza del SCVMC rispetto ad OSMA, il costo di retrofitting totale è minore
nella struttura fiorentina rispetto a quella californiana.
Conclusioni
Lo studio ha progettato un adeguato strumento di supporto ai decisori per la mit-
igazione del rischio sismico nelle strutture sanitarie moderne (Stati Uniti e Eu-
ropa), fornendo un prototipo software in grado di simulare gli effetti ed i costi
dell’applicazione delle differenti azioni di retrofitting sismico sulle strutture sanitarie.
Inoltre, l’utilizzo di indici quantitativi per la valutazione delle funzioni strategiche
e di accoglienza (HTC, IS, HTCI e HPI) permettono analisi approfondite su diversi
aspetti dell’ospedale e aiutano il confronto con altre strutture sanitarie, anche se
situate in contesti simici differenti.
Zusammenfassung (DE)
Zielsetzung
Krankenhausinfrastrukturen und deren Funktionalität stellen die letzte – und damit
die wichtigste – Einheit der medizinischen Antwort nach einem Erdbeben dar. Um
einen solchen Notfall angemessen medizinisch koordinieren zu können, ist es grund-
sätzlich nötig, eine einfache, schnelle und zuverlässigen Risiko-Beurteilung auszuführen,
die die Einstufung der direkten und indirekten seismischen Auswirkungen auf alle
Akteure im Gesundheitswesen zum Ziel hat. Der Zweck meiner Arbeit ist es, ein
Modell zu entwerfen, das die Entscheidungsträger dabei unterstützt, die Auswirkung
en von Erdbeben auf das Gesundheitswesen durch die Anwendung von adäquaten
Risiko-Reduktions-Strategien zu mindern.
Grundlegende Resultate
Auf einer Kombination zweier Untersuchungsansätze aufbauend wurde eine neue,
integrative Methode entwickelt, die mögliche Gefahren adäquat zu identifizieren ver-
sucht: Die Theorie komplexer Analysesysteme vergleicht Leontiefs In-Out-Analyse
mit der Fehlerbaumanalyse, sowie mit der Abschätzung seismischer Gefährdung
mittels Verwendung von speziellen Evaluationsbögen zur raschen Datengewinnung.
Erstens beinhaltet das Arbeitsprogramm eine Risiko-Bewertung für Krankenhaus-
sicherheit des OSMA- Krankenhauses in Florenz inklusive dessen Aufnahmekapaz-
ität im Notfall. Zweitens wurde die Validität des Modells anhand eines realen
Vorfalls (L’Aquila, 2009) getestet. Drittens umfasst es die Risiko - Reduktions -
Strukturen des Santa Clara Valley Medical Center in USA. Die theoretische Anwen
dung des Modells konnte herausfinden, dass das Leontief-Modell weniger zuverläs-
sig und überzeugend ist als die Fehlerbaumanalyse, besonders in Fällen, in denen
eine hohe seismische Aktivität zu verzeichnen ist. Die Risiko- Reduktions- Phase
zeigte, dass strukturelle Interventionen keine weitere positive Verbesserung im Ver-
gleich zu nicht-strukturellen Interventionen bieten. Darüber hinaus kann das Flo-
renz Krankenhaus im Notfall nur dann mit einer angemessenen Aufnahmekapaz-
ität dienen, wenn simultan eine Maßnahme in zwei Schritten erfolgt, die Reparatur
grundlegender technischer Installationen und der in medizinischen Geräte.
Zusammenfassung und Ausblick
Die Studie liefert einen Software-Prototypen zur angemessenen Unterstützung der
Entscheidungsträger moderner Gesundheitsinfrastruktur indem er den Typ der In-
tervention, die technische Komplexität und die wirtschaftlichen Kosten simulieren
kann. Weiterhin beinhaltet der neue Ansatz sowohl Strategie- als auch Beherber-
gungsfunktionen des Gesundheitswesens, indem er quantitative Indizes nutzt, wie
z.B. Krankenhaus-Behandlungs-Kapazität durch den “Hospital Treatment Capac-
ity” HTC sowie den Index “Intrinsic Security” (IS), der die Sicherheit der schwäch-
sten Patienten bestimmt und es ermöglicht, verschiedene Krankenhäuser in diversen
seismischen Gebieten zu vergleich.

Table of Contents
Glossary 1
Introduction 5
I. METHODOLOGY 7
1. Seismic Risk Management in Hospitals 9
1.1. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.1.1. The medical response: a system within a complex system . . . 9
1.1.2. Hospital system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.2. Analysis of the State of Art . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.2.1. ISO Standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.2.2. International Guidelines in Healthcare . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1.2.3. The ’Critical Infrastructures’ Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1.2.4. The Risk Management Chain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2. Seismic Vulnerability Assessment 33
2.1. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.2. Rapid Vulnerability Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.2.1. General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.2.2. Structural evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.2.3. Non-structural evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.2.4. Administrative/organizational evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.2.5. Fire vulnerability assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.3. Hospital System Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.3.1. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.3.2. The Input - Output Inoperability Leontief Model . . . . . . . 48
2.3.3. FTA Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.4. Hospital Performance Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3. Seismic Risk Assessment 57
3.1. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.2. Hazard Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.3. Risk Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
i
Table of Contents
4. Seismic Risk Mtitgation 61
4.1. Response and Prevention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
4.2. Direct Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
4.3. Indirect Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4.4. Cost Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
4.4.1. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
4.4.2. Cost Analysis of Direct Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
4.4.3. Cost Analysis of Indirect Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
II. RESULTS 69
5. Risk Assessment - Italian Case Study (OSMA) 71
5.1. OSMA Hospital Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
5.2. Seismic Vulnerability Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
5.3. Performance Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
5.3.1. Sensitivity Analysis on System and Performance Degradation 79
5.4. Response Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
6. Methodology Validation 89
6.1. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
6.2. San Salvatore Hospital and L’Aquila Earthquake (2009) . . . . . . . . 89
6.3. Seismic Vulnerability Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
6.4. Performance Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
6.5. Response Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
6.6. Validation Outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
7. Risk Assessment - US Case Study(SCVMC) 101
7.1. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
7.2. Seismic Vulnerability Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
7.3. Performance Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
7.4. Seismic Sensitivity Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
7.4.1. System Degradation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
7.4.2. Performance Degradation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
7.5. Response Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
7.6. Comparison With the Italian Case Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
7.6.1. Hospital Vulnerability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
7.6.2. Hospital Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
7.6.3. Hospital Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
8. Risk Mitigation at OSMA and SCVMC 117
8.1. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
8.2. OSMA Hospital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
8.2.1. Direct Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
ii
Table of Contents
8.2.2. Indirect Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
8.2.3. Cost Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
8.3. Santa Clara Valley Medical Center (US) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
8.3.1. Direct Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
8.3.2. Indirect Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
8.3.3. Cost Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
8.4. OSMA - SCVMC Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
9. The DSS prototype 145
9.1. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
9.2. Risk Technology as Risk Dissemination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
9.3. DSS Prototype . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
9.3.1. Software Mock-up as Technology Prototyping . . . . . . . . . 146
9.3.2. Description of the System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
10.Conclusions and Further Developments 151
References 153
iii

Glossary
In the field of risk, although several different disciplines work on natural hazards
and the impact on a general system, there are many approaches which, according
to the different scientific focuses, build and use specific definitions or give different
meaning to the same terms. Hence, the following definitions are given with the aim
to provide a precise meaning to each specific and general risk related term used
within this thesis. Working definitions on the used indices in the work are reported
below as well. Besides the definitions within the International PhD program on
“Mitigation of risk due to natural hazards on structures and infrastructures “, a part
of this glossary is adapted from the European Commission’s Framework Program
7 project “MOVE - Methods for the Improvement of Vulnerability Assessment in
Europe” which has been updated, integrated and specialized to the specific topic of
the thesis: the seismic risk mitigation of health structures.
Severity
The potential consequences of an accident/natural disaster (e.g. earthquake) on
the hospital infrastructure resulting in loss of operational performance or occupants
safety and security levels degradation.
Occurrence
The probability that a specific event can occur.
Hazarda
A potentially adverse physical event, phenomenon or human activity that may cause
harm to the predefined System.
Resiliencec
Adaptive ability of a socio-ecological system to cope and absorb negative impacts
as result of the capacity to anticipate, respond and recover from damaging events.
Preparednessc
Measures taken to organize and facilitate operations of early warnings, search and
rescue activities and rehabilitation of the population and the economy in case of a
disaster.
Exposurec
The social and material context represented by persons, resources, infrastructure,
production, goods, services and ecosystems that may be affected by a hazard. Ex-
posure varies in time and space.
1
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Damagea
Describes the physical, biological or chemical effect on an element at risk caused by
the impact of a hazard of a given intensity. Damage captures the material harm
and is not expressed in monetary terms.
Systema
The object of investigation for which all sources of hazard are identified and risk
analysis is being performed. The system can be composed by a single building or
infrastructure element, a suburb of a city, a whole urban region or even an entire
country.
Complex systemb
A complex system is a system composed of interconnected parts that as a whole
exhibit one or more properties (behavior among the possible properties) not obvious
from the properties of the individual parts.
Vulnerabilityc
The susceptibility to suffer damages or the intrinsic fragility of exposed elements,
systems or communities that favours loss when affected by hazard events.
Capacityc
A combination of all strengths and resources available within a community, system
or organisation that can reduce the level of risk, or the effects of a disaster.
Capacity to anticipatec
Ordered and coherent set of strategies, programs and projects that orient activities
favouring the reduction, prevision and control of risk and emergency preparedness
and post impact disaster recovery. This includes all the retrofitting actions to be
carried out for improving seismic behavior of the system.
Capacity to copec
The ability of people, organizations, systems and/or communities, using available
skills and resources to face and manage adverse conditions, emergencies or disasters
that could lead to or are caused by a hazard or harmful process.
Capacity to recoverc
Capacity to restore adequate and sustainable living conditions in an area or commu-
nity affected by a disaster. This may be achieved by means of rehabilitation, repair,
reconstruction or replacement of destroyed, interrupted or deteriorated infrastruc-
ture, goods and services.
Vulnerability assessmentc
The measurement of vulnerability related to the degree of exposure, susceptibility
and lack of resilience of a general system.
2
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Riskc
The potential occurrence of harmful consequences or losses resulting from interac-
tions between natural or anthropogenic hazards and vulnerable conditions.
Risk = V ulnerability ×Hazard
Element-at-Risk (EaR)a
A single or a group of persons or objects within the predefined System that are
susceptible and exposed to the impact of a Hazard. In order to guarantee a complete
coverage, all Element at Risk collectively should compose the entire System that is
being investigated.
Risk assessmentc
The process of apprehending the nature of risk and determining its level. It combines
the evaluation by experts and the evaluation by stakeholders.
Risk analysisc
Evaluation of a risk by experts which is based on hazard and vulnerability assess-
ment, and is performed on scientific bases.
Risk managementa
The systematic application of management policies, procedures and practices to
the tasks of a multidisciplinary process leading to the planning and application of
policies, strategies, to the task of identifying, assessing, treating, communicating,
reviewing and monitoring Risk.
Risk mitigationa
The planning and execution of measures designed to reduce risk to acceptable levels.
Direct intervention
All those seismic retrofitting actions carried out by directly intervening on the system
such as the structural or non-structural activities.
Indirect intervention
All those seismic retrofitting actions carried out by indirectly intervening on the
system such as the usage of medical mobile units or the medical evacuation to other
hospitals.
Hospital Treatment Capacity
The number of surgical operations feasible per hour by the hospital.
Hospital Treatment Demand
The number of people that requires surgical treatment.
3
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Hospital Treatment Capacity Index
The estimation of the treatment capacity level of the hospital to comply with the
local medical needs.
Intrinsic Security
The capacity of the health structure to guarantee safe and secure hospital beds
including the ones in the Intensive Care Unit.
Hospital Performance Index
Numerical combination between the strategic (HTCI) and the hosting (IS) functions
of the hospital system according to the hospital category: city, country or small town
hospital.
aPliefke T., Sperbeck S. and Urban M. The probabilistic risk management chain -
general concept and definitions
bJoslyn, C. and Rocha, L. (2000). Towards semiotic agent-based models of socio-
technical organizations, Proc. AI, Simulation and Planning in High Autonomy Sys-
tems (AIS 2000) Conference, Tucson, Arizona, pp. 70-79.
cEuropean Commission’s Framework Program 7 project “MOVE - Methods for the
Improvement of Vulnerability Assessment in Europe
4
Introduction
As it constitutes the final point in the rescue chain, the hospital system is one of
the most important elements of medical responses to the aftermath of earthquakes.
The operational continuity of health structures is essential to the efficient response
of the emergency medical system just as it is necessary to guarantee a very high
level of building resistance to protect medical patients during an earthquake who
are likely not self-sufficient or depending on life-support devices. Although many
structural and non-structural actions already exist in the field of seismic reduction,
their application remains difficult given the degree of complexity of hospital systems.
Hence, the aim of this thesis is to provide healthcare decision makers with a “decision
support system (DSS)” so to appropriately plan retrofitting interventions in order
to reduce seismic risk in hospitals.
This thesis is divided into two main parts. The first part reports upon the develop-
ment of the model and the second uses case studies to demonstrate its application.
The first part starts in chapter 1 with a general overview on the risk management
process, paying considerable attention to its application to health care and describes
the international state of the art in the field of hospitals and seismic risk and it
explains the role of the hospital within the entire rescue chain during earthquakes.
Chapters 2-4 present the developed methodology for the hospital risk mitigation
according to three specific phases: vulnerability assessment, risk analysis and risk
mitigation.
The second part of the thesis starts with the application of the integrated model,
based on a combination of the complex systems theory and the rapid seismic assess-
ment, at OSMA Hospital in Florence (chapter 5). This is followed by the validation
with the application to the real case given by the San Salvatore hospital during the
2009 earthquake (chapter 6). In chapter 7 the same model is applied to the US hos-
pital Santa Clara Valley Medical Center (SCVMC). The model application included
accessing hospital data about structural, technology and organizational features and
conducting interviews with hospital engineers and medical doctors. The use of ex-
amples from the United States and Europe gives a general model, feasible to every
modern general hospital. Proper quantitative indices were also defined with the
aim of objectively estimating the performance level of the hospital and carrying out
hospital benchmarking in risk analysis.
Discussions and case study comparisons are reported in chapter 8 by considering
both scenarios with the application of direct and indirect interventions. A cost
analysis according to the different mitigating actions is reported as well.
5
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Finally, chapter 9 reports on the prototypization of the DSS by the use of the
standard software mock up and prototype models in the information technology
area before the conclusions and further developments.
6
Part I.
METHODOLOGY
7

1. Seismic Risk Management in
Hospitals
1.1. Overview
1.1.1. The medical response: a system within a complex system
According to Quarentelly (1985) disaster is defined as a crisis situation that far
exceeds the capabilities. Despite of the definition, which states that cannot be a
perfect ideal system that prevents damage, because then it would not be a disaster,
currently, disasters can be reasonably and in some cases accurately predicted or
mitigated by technological, social and scientific advances[1]. As reported in figure
1.1, the trend of disaster occurrence in the world from the 1950 to 2011 has been
continuously increasing [2]. Especially regarding the seismic events, they have been
striking constantly during the last 60 years, 5 big events just in the last four years
(L’Aquila - Italy 2009, Padang - Indonesia 2009, Chile 2010, Haiti 2010, Christchurch
- New Zealand 2011).
Figure 1.1.: Great natural catastrophes worldwide 1950-2011: number of events
with trend [2].
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Chapter 1 Seismic Risk Management in Hospitals
During earthquakes, the medical response chain depends on many different and
complex interconnected systems which are: the hospital infrastructure, the road
viability, the rescue and search and all those civil protection activities regarding the
security, technical support, aerial medical evacuation and field hospital installation.
Every single system of the chain depends on the others and is directly responsible for
the others’ performance. According to the Italian legislature, the first act providing
guidelines and suggestions on the medical response during disasters is the Law n.
225 (February 24th, 1992) [3] which formally founded the Italian Civil Protection
by defining which specific activities are under the responsibility of which specific
institutions (municipalities, central government, fire brigades, police and medical
emergency offices). The specific activities depend on the phase where they belong
to, which are the followings: “coordination phase”, ”prevention, rescue and search
and recover” and “disaster types definitions”. The last phase defines the domain of
intervention of the civil protection components in relation to the disaster types:
• Natural or man made events potentially solvable by the single local adminis-
tration (municipal level);
• Natural or man made events potentially solvable by the synergy of multiple
local administrations (regional or provincial level);
• Natural or man made events potentially solvable by extraordinary powers and
activities (National level).
The necessity of organizing an appropriate medical response in case of disasters
if foreseen only for the last type of events. The organizational process includes
planning and prevention and includes the emergency ambulance department and
the hospital system, classified under the term Health National System. Next, with
the provision of the legislative act n. 112 (march 31st 1998) [4] some of the cen-
tral activities are transferred under the regional level, and with the publication of
the Internal Affair Minister Act DPCM 13/02/2001 [5], a practical guideline is fi-
nally given in order to standardize the planning activity concerning the medical res
ponse management during disasters. The suggested steps include:
• Local risk identification;
• Risk analysis;
• Scenario development;
• Disaster planning publication.
As reported in figure 1.2(a), when the acute emergency phase is solved within the 12
hours, the disaster medical response chain indicates the use of only regular hospitals,
while in case of emergency duration over the 12 hours limit, the medical chain
foresees the integrated use of regular and field hospital units, see figure 1.2(b).
Most of the times, the use of mobile medical units aims to provide a first clinical
stabilization in order to guarantee a safe transportation to hospitals, especially for
the severe injured people. For this reason a triage process is always recommended at
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the event site as well as beside the hospital emergency department for both scenarios
(a) and (b). With the term triage is intended the process of determining the priority
of patients’ treatments based on the severity of their condition [6] The term comes
from the French verb trier, meaning to separate, sift or select [7]. Triage may result
in determining the order and priority of emergency treatment, the order and priority
of emergency transport, or the destination for the patient. Triage is fundamental
for the medical response during disasters (e.g. earthquake) because, given the high
number of casualties, a good triage can optimize the use of the limited resources for
treating only the most severe injured people and resulting very important in saving
lives[9].
Figure 1.2.: Medical response chain according to the different
One of the most used triage model in the international context is the S.T.A.R.T. sys-
tem (Simple Triage and Rapid Treatment), developed by the California emergency
workers for use in earthquakes at Hoag Hospital in Newport Beach, California.
START triage separates the injured into four groups:
• The expectant who are beyond help – blue tag;
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• The injured who can be helped by immediate transportation – red tag;
• The injured whose transport can be delayed – yellow tag;
• Those with minor injuries, who need help less urgently – green tag.
The START model, which introduces the blue tag for those casualties who can’t
be saved with the limited medical resources during the disaster, is based on three
simple clinical evaluations which are the respiratory frequency, the pulse rate and
the mental status, see the flowchart in figure 1.3. It is now clear by the analysis of
the medical response chain during disasters how the hospital system represents, for
any type of event, the final point of the whole medical response. For this reason in
the next sections the focus will be given to the development of a risk management
process for hospital in case of earthquakes.
Figure 1.3.: S.T.A.R.T. triage flow chart for the casualty tagging [8].
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1.1.2. Hospital system
A proper seismic risk management process in hospitals should consider the seismic
scenario where the “hospital system” is exposed to the event in order to find out
which may be the most critical affected elements and how they could be strength-
ened. Hospital system must face immediately with a huge number of casualties.
The hospital scenario during disasters and especially in aftermath of earthquakes
sees hospitals facing a huge number of casualties which mostly reach the structure
within the first 24 hours. Indeed by investigating the number of survivors’ distri-
bution over time after an earthquake, the “golden 24 hours” should be considered
as a measurement of the predicted probability of finding survivors over time after
an earthquake [10-12]. The earthquake epidemiologic distribution shows that after
24 hours, 80% of the extracted victims are still alive, afterwards the survival rate
decreases rapidly [13].
Hospital resources are limited with respect to the medical needs.
Three different “casualties waves” reach the emergency department in aftermath of
an earthquake. First wave is the biggest and it is composed by the green triaged
casualties which get the hospital by themselves by using public transports and/or
own cars without necessarily passing through a triage control at the site of the event,
see figure 1.4 [44]. Second wave is composed by the red and yellow tagged casualties
which are ambulance transported. Finally the third wave includes casualties’ rela-
tives and friends with the need of psychological support and mass media. Clinically
is really important to have a specific triage station supporting the hospital emer-
gency department with a filtering role to the health structures in order to minimize
the use of the limited medical resources with the least severe casualties.
Figure 1.4.: Casualties transportation to hospitals [44]
Hospital can’t be functional During earthquakes the hospital can be damaged and
losing a partial or the whole treatment capacity. Table 1.1 reports the health facili-
ties’ performance degradation due to the resulting damages during the Bam earth-
quake [14]. Fourteen facilities got 100% damage while the remaining two hospitals
(Emam District Hospital and Mahdieh Maternity Hospital) resulting 50% damaged.
While the management of the hospital overcrowding scenario can be organized by
a proper emergency planning, the problem presented here needs a deeper analysis
which should consider the health structure vulnerability, the level of medical needs
satisfaction (before and after the event) and how this levels according to the specific
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hospital can be improved. For this reason, in the next paragraphs a systematic re-
view on the international state of art of risk management is carried out by focusing
on the specific applications to hospitals.
Health Facility Number of beds Percent Damage
Health House Urban 95 100
Rural Health Center(RHC) 14 100
Health Center(UHC) 10 100
Health Posts (Urban) 5 100
Maternity Facilities(as part of RHC) 5 100
Emam District Hospital (public) 136 50
Mahdieh Maternity Hospital (public) 54 40
Aflatoonyan Hospital (private) 6 100
Emergency Station(115) 1 100
Behvarz Training Center 1 100
District Health Network Expansion Center 1 100
District Health Care Management Center 1 100
Faculty of Nursing and Paramedics 2000miles 100
Dormitory of the Faculty of Nursing 1500miles 100
Table 1.1.: District Health Care Delivery System and the damage due to the earth-
quake in Bam[14].
1.2. Analysis of the State of Art
According to the following definition, risk management is the identification, assess-
ment, and prioritization of risks followed by coordinated and economical application
of resources to minimize, monitor, and control the probability and/or impact of un-
fortunate events or to maximize the realization of opportunities[14]. Although risk
management is a continuous activity, the effects of an appropriate risk management
process are very evident during disasters (i.e. natural or man-made). Risk should be
first defined, in order to be reduced since it strongly depends on the context where
the object of study is located (i.e. financial-risk, environmental-risk, technical-risk,
health-risk, social-risk). A unique definition of risk cannot always be applied. In
Pliefke et.al. [a] there are several definitions of risk regarding disasters, and in spite
of the fact that the context of the object of study may vary, defining the risk should
always include the definitions of the following elements: hazard, loss, damage, vul-
nerability, exposure and consequences. Next, the state of art or risk management is
analyzed, in order to see how the international regulations and scientific literature
define and contextualize general and specific risks, especially the ones concerning
healthcare and hospital infrastructure.
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1.2.1. ISO Standards
1.2.1.1. General
This International Organization for Standardization (ISO) provides technical guide-
lines in many social and industrial sectors. In the case of the ISO 31000:2009 and
ISO 31010:2009, they concern principles and generic guidelines on risk management
since all activities of an organization involve risks [16, 17] and represents the base
for every risk management activity application to any area of interest while the
ISO Guide 73:2009 provides the definitions of generic terms related to risk man-
agement [18]. The Risk management process should ensure that organizations have
an appropriate response to the hazards or ordinary damages affecting them. Risk
management should thus help avoid ineffective and inefficient responses to risk that
can prevent legitimate activities and/or distort resource allocation. To be effective
within an organization, risk management should be an integrated part of the organi-
zation’s overall governance, management, reporting processes, policies, philosophy
and culture. The same risk management approach can be adopted to all activi-
ties of an organization including projects, defined functions, assets, and products
or activities and will in turn strengthen the linkages between these activities and
the organization’s overall objectives. The relationship between the principles for
managing risk, the risk management framework and the risk management process
is shown in Figure 1.5.
To be successful, the risk management should be part of a general risk management
framework within the organization which gives, according to the internal organiza-
tions and the general context, the operational resources and tools for carrying out
the risk management activities, see figure 1.6.
Moreover, the framework should ensure that all the risk information derived from
the process must be adequately reported and used as a basis for future updates,
decision making and accountability. As reported in figure 1.7, the risk management
process includes five activities: communication and consultation, establishing the
context, risk assessment, risk treatment, monitoring and review.
1.2.1.2. Communication and consultation
In order to fully understand the risk connection with the context, communication
and consultation with internal and external stakeholders should take place at each
stage of the risk management process and addressing issues relating to the risk itself,
its consequences (if known), and the measures being taken to manage it such as:
• help define the context appropriately;
• ensure that the interests of stakeholders are understood and considered;
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Figure 1.5.: ISO 31000:2009 - Risk Management - Principles and guidelines on
implementation.
• bring different areas of expertise together for analyzing risks;
• help ensure that risks are adequately identified;
• ensure that different views are appropriately considered in evaluating risks;
• enhance appropriate change management during the risk management process;
• secure endorsement and support for a treatment plan;
• develop an appropriate internal and external communication and consultation
plan.
1.2.1.3. Establishing the context
By establishing the context, the internal and external parameters can be defined
when managing risk. The external context means the external environment in which
the organization seeks to achieve its objectives and can include, but it is not limited
to the cultural, political, legal, regulatory, financial, technological, economic, natural
and environmental, whether international, national, regional or local key drivers,
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Figure 1.6.: ISO 31000:2009 –General Risk Management Framework.
and trends having impact on the objectives of the organization and perceptions and
values of external stakeholders.
For internal context, it is considered the internal environment in which the orga-
nization seeks to achieve its objectives. Internal context is anything within the
organization that can influence the way in which an organization will manage risk,
and it should be established because:
• risk management takes place in the context of the objectives of the organiza-
tion;
• objectives and criteria of a particular project or activity should be considered
in the light of objectives of the organization as a whole;
• a major risk for some organizations is failure to achieve their strategic, project
or business objectives, and this risk affects ongoing organizational commit-
ment, credibility, trust and value.
It is necessary to understand the internal context regarding:
• capabilities, understood in terms of resources and knowledge;
• information systems, information flows, and decision making processes;
• internal stakeholders;
• policies, objectives, and the strategies that are in place to achieve them;
• perceptions, values and culture;
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Figure 1.7.: ISO 31000:2009 –Activities involved during the Risk Management
Process.
• standards and reference models adopted by the organization;
• structures (e.g. governance, roles and accountabilities).
1.2.1.4. Risk assessment
Risk assessment is the overall process of risk identification, risk analysis and risk
evaluation.
Risk identification
The organization should identify sources of risk, areas of impacts, events and their
causes and their potential consequences. The aim of this step is to generate a com-
prehensive list of risks based on those events that might enhance, prevent, degrade
or delay the achievement of the objectives.
What can happen, where and when?
The aim is to generate a comprehensive list of sources of risks and events that
might have an impact on the achievement of each of the objectives identified in the
context. These events might prevent, degrade, delay or enhance the achievement
of those objectives. These are then considered in more detail to identify what can
happen.
Why and how it can happen?
Having identified what might happen, it is necessary to consider possible causes
and scenarios. There are many ways an event can occur. It is important that no
significant causes are omitted.
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Tools and techniques
Approaches used to identify risks include checklists, judgments based on experience
and records, flow charts, brainstorming, systems analysis, scenario analysis and
systems engineering techniques. The approach used will depend on the nature of
the activities under review, types of risk, the organizational context and the purpose
of the risk management study.
Risk analysis
Risk analysis is about developing an understanding of the risk. It includes an input
to decisions on whether risks need to be treated and the most appropriate and
cost-effective risk treatment strategies. Risk analysis involves consideration of the
sources of risk, their positive and negative consequences and the likelihood that
those consequences may occur. Factors that affect consequences and likelihood may
be identified. Risk is analyzed by combining consequences and their likelihood. In
most circumstances existing controls are taken into account. A preliminary analysis
can be carried out so that similar risks are combined or low-impact risks are excluded
from detailed study. Excluded risks should, where possible, be listed to demonstrate
the completeness of the risk analysis.
Evaluate existing controls
Identify the existing processes, devices or practices that act to minimize negative
risks or enhance positive risks and assess their strengths and weaknesses. Controls
may arise as outcomes of previous risk treatment activities.
Consequences and likelihood The most pertinent information sources and techniques
should be used when analyzing consequences and likelihood. Sources of information
may include the following:
• Past records;
• Practice and relevant experience;
• Relevant published literature;
• Market research;
• The results of public consultation;
• Experiments and prototypes;
• Economic, engineering or other models;
• Specialist and expert opinions.
While regarding with the tools and techniques, they include:
• structured interviews with experts in the area of interest;
• use of multi-disciplinary groups of experts;
• individual evaluations using questionnaires;
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• use of models and simulations.
Furthermore, in the part called “Types of Analysis” the norm reports the different
risk analysis which can be undertaken to varying degrees of detail depending upon
the risk, the purpose of the analysis, and the information, data and resources avail-
able. Analysis may be qualitative, semi-quantitative or quantitative or a combina-
tion of these, depending on the circumstances. Moreover, the ISO 31000 underlines
the necessity to control and evaluate the data certainty that is called “Sensitivity
analysis.” Since some of the estimates made in risk analysis are imprecise, a sensi-
tivity analysis should be carried out to test the effect of uncertainty in assumptions
and data. Sensitivity analysis is also a way of testing the appropriateness and effec-
tiveness of potential controls and risk treatment options.
Risk evaluation
The purpose of risk evaluation is to assist in making decisions, based on the out-
comes of risk analysis, about which risks need treatment to prioritize treatment
implementation. Risk evaluation involves comparing the level of risk found during
the analysis process with risk criteria established when the context was considered.
The risk evaluation can also lead to a decision not to treat the risk in any way other
than maintaining existing risk controls.
1.2.1.5. Risk treatment
Risk treatment involves selecting one or more options for modifying risks, and imple-
menting those options. Risk treatment involves a cyclical process of assessing a risk
treatment; deciding whether residual risk levels are tolerable or not; if not tolerable
generating a new risk treatment; and assessing the effect of that treatment until the
residual risk reached complies with the organization’s risk criteria. Risk treatment
options are not necessarily mutually exclusive or appropriate in all circumstances.
The options can include the following:
• avoiding the risk by deciding not to start or continue with the activity that
gives rise to the risk;
• seeking an opportunity by deciding to start or continue with an activity likely
to create or enhance the risk;
• removing the source of the risk;
• changing the nature and magnitude of likelihood;
• changing the consequences;
• sharing the risk with another party or parties;
• retaining the risk by choice.
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Selecting the most appropriate risk treatment option involves balancing the costs
and efforts of implementation against the benefits derived having regard to legal,
regulatory, and other requirements, social responsibility and the protection of the
natural environment. Decisions should also take into account risks that can warrant
risk treatment actions that are not justifiable on economic grounds e.g. severe (high
negative consequence) but rare (low likelihood) risks. The organization can benefit
from the adoption of a combination of treatment options. Where risk treatment
options can impact on risk elsewhere in the organization, these areas should be
involved in the decision. Though equally effective, some risk treatments can be
more acceptable to stakeholders than others. Risk treatment itself can introduce
risks. A significant risk can be the failure or ineffectiveness of the risk treatment
measures. The residual risk should be documented and subjected to monitoring,
review and, where appropriate, further treatment.
1.2.1.6. Monitoring and review
Monitoring and review should be a planned part of the risk management process.
Responsibilities for monitoring and review should be clearly defined. The organi-
zation’s monitoring and review processes should encompass all aspects of the risk
management process for the purposes of:
• analyzing and learning lessons from events, changes and trends;
• detecting changes in the external and internal context including changes to
the risk itself which can require revision of risk treatments and priorities;
• ensuring that the risk control and treatment measures are effective in both
design and operation; and identifying emerging risks.
Actual progress in implementing risk treatment plans provides a performance mea-
sure and can be incorporated into the organization’s performance management, mea-
surement and internal and external reporting activities. Monitoring and review can
involve regular checking or surveillance of what is already present or can be peri-
odic or ad hoc. Both aspects should be planned. The results of monitoring and
review should be recorded and internally or externally reported as appropriate and
should also be used as an input to the review of the risk management framework.
Regarding the possible types of assessment techniques, ISO 31010:2009 reports a
classification based on the relevance of influencing factors (low, medium and high)
and on possibility to have quantitative outputs, see table 1.2.
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Table 1.2.: Example of risk assessment techniques [17].
1.2.2. International Guidelines in Healthcare
1.2.2.1. JCAHO Standard EC.1.4
The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) is a
United States-based nonprofit organization that accredits more than 19,000 health
care organizations and programs in the United States[19, 20]. The Intent of EC.1.4
is to provide a tool for completing a security management plan which describes how
the organization will establish and maintain a security management program to pro-
tect staff, patients, and visitors from harm during disasters and in ordinary activity.
The new emergency management standards for hospitals, long term care, behavioral
health, and ambulatory care implemented on January 1, 2001 introduces concepts
into existing standards and infuses the concept of community involvement into the
management process and assists health organizations in preparing for, and manag-
ing, a variety of potential emergencies such as earthquakes. The plan addresses four
phases of emergency management: mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery.
At a minimum, the emergency management plan is developed with the involvement
of the hospital leaders, including those of the medical staff. The Joint Commission
on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) has significantly revised the
standard for emergency management (EC.1.4) in the 2001 edition of the Compre-
hensive Accreditation Manual for Hospitals. The hospital must now function as an
integrated entity within the scope of the broader community. Although hospitals
have always had to respond to a variety of disasters, the 2001 standard continues
to state that the hospital response plans must be based on a hazard vulnerability
analysis performed by the hospital. Although the terminology “hazard vulnerability
analysis” may be new to many hospitals, the concept itself is not new. The approach
reported in the document includes the following main points:
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• Risk Analysis
– Hazard Analysis;
– Probability evaluation;
– Severity analysis;
– Preparedness evaluation.
• Analysis tool implementation.
Hazard vulnerability analysis is often based on an all hazards approach. This means
that one begins with a list of all possible disasters, regardless of their likelihood, ge-
ographic impact, or potential outcome. The list may be the result of a committee
brainstorming session, research, or other methodology, and should be as comprehen-
sive as possible. It may be helpful to divide the potential hazards into categories
to focus the thought process. Typical categories may include natural hazards, tech-
nological hazards, and human events. Ultimately, each identified hazard will be
evaluated for its probability of occurrence, risk to the organization, and the organi-
zations current level of preparedness. Establishing the probability of occurrence of
these various events is only part objective and statistical, the remainder can best be
considered intuitive or highly subjective. Each hazard should be evaluated in some
terms that will reflect its likelihood, for example, by using the qualitative terms of
high, medium, low, or no probability of occurrence. For Severity is intended the
potential impact that any given hazard may have on the organization. It must be
analyzed to include a variety of factors, which may include, but are not limited to
the following:
• Threat to human life;
• Threat to health and safety;
• Property damage;
• Systems failure;
• Economic loss;
• Loss of community trust/goodwill;
• Legal ramifications.
The threat to human life and the lesser threat to health and safety are considered to
be so significant that they are given separate consideration on the hazard vulnerabil-
ity analysis document. The remaining three categories on the analysis tool classify
risk factors as to their disruption to the organization in high, moderate, or low clas-
sification. From the bulleted list above, property damage, systems failure, economic
loss, loss of community trust, and legal ramifications are all considered together to
determine the level of risk. Seismic activity may virtually destroy a building, or ren-
der it uninhabitable. In the most severe scenario of this type, the property damage
will also include equipment and supplies within the facility. Systems failure may
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have been the cause of the emergency in the first place. A major utility failure may
require backup equipment or service that is significantly less convenient, or may not
be sustainable for a lengthy time. Even though an alternate system is available,
the failure will typically cause a hospital to implement emergency plans. A related
issue to loss of goodwill is the potential for legal ramifications in the aftermath of a
disaster. If errors were made in the management of the emergency, if lives were lost
or injuries occurred, the hospital could face legal action. The evaluation of the level
of preparedness to manage any given disaster has to consider organizational proce-
dures, standards following and resources availability to support the hospital in its
response. The hazard vulnerability analysis tool has to evaluate the organization’s
preparedness level as good, fair, or poor. An alternative way of approaching this
issue is to evaluate each hazard based on the amount of improvement needed, for
example, slight, moderate, or major. Below (figure 1.8) is reported an example of
check list for vulnerability evaluation and collect the information suggested by the
American Society for Healthcare Engineering ASHE [20,45].
1.2.2.2. World Health Organization (WHO) and United Nations (UN)
Guidelines
PAHO/WHO - Disaster Mitigation Program
In the year 2000, the Pan American Health Organization/World Health Organization
International Hospital Mitigation Advisory Committee, through a multidisciplinary
approach, published within the Disaster Mitigation in Health Facilities series, the
following four guidelines aiming to different aspects of the common goal: disaster
mitigation in hospitals. The four books, including General, Administrative, Archi-
tectural and the Engineering Issues, aim to examine the potential problems that
can arise when disasters strike health facilities, and offering specific mitigation mea-
sures on the key components for providing continuously the vital services during
and in the immediate aftermath of a major emergency such as seismic events, which
represent the natural disaster that mostly affects the health facilities [21].
United Nations (UN) - Disaster Risk Management Program
During the year 2007, the Indian National Disaster Management Division within the
Disaster Risk Management Program produced a specific guideline on the “Seismic
Safety of Non-Structural Elements & Contents of Hospital Buildings”.
The high attention to non-structural elements depends on the following factors [22]:
• Hospital facilities must remain as intact as possible by providing routine medi-
cal services as well as attending to the possible increase in demand for medical
treatment following an earthquake;
• In contrast to other types of buildings, hospitals accommodate a large number
of patients who, due to their disabilities, are unable to evacuate a building in
the event of an earthquake;
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• Hospitals have a complex network of electrical, mechanical and sanitary facili-
ties as well as a significant amount of costly equipment all of which are essential
both for the routine operation of the hospital and for emergency care. Failure
of these installations due to a seismic event cannot be tolerated in hospitals
as this could result in its functional collapse;
• The ratio of the cost of nonstructural elements to the total cost of the build-
ing is much higher in hospitals than in other buildings. While nonstructural
elements represent approximately 60% of the value in housing and office build-
ings, in hospitals these values range from 80% to 90%, mainly due to the cost
of medical equipment and specialized facilities.
In the year 2008, still within the Disaster Risk Management Program, the Disaster
Management Unit of the United Nations Development Program of India published
guidelines for Hospital Emergencies Preparedness Planning [23].
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Figure 1.8.: ASHE check list for the hazard vulnerability evaluation [20].
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WHO - Assessment of Health Facilities in Responding to Emergencies
The publication of the protocol “Assessment of Health Facilities in Responding to
Emergencies” published by World Health Organization in 2006 is a management
tool for health professionals evaluating the preparedness of health facilities for deal-
ing with disasters by providing definitions, evaluation checklists and relevant case
studies [24]. The guideline focuses on the preparedness assessment and vulner-
ability assessment because performing regular vulnerability assessments allows a
health facility to effectively identify and modify factors that increase its suscepti-
bility and decrease its resilience [24]. The manual is divided into three main parts:
a questionnaire and an overview of the health facility’s capabilities, Assessment
of General Emergency and Preparedness, Structural Vulnerability - Non-structural
Vulnerability -Functional Vulnerability and Assessment of Preparedness for Specific
Emergencies which are becoming increasingly relevant: Industrial Emergencies, In-
fectious Disease Outbreaks, and Biological, Chemical and Radiologic Emergencies.
The manual presents a series of evaluation checklists that were formulated based on
information from current literature.
WHO - Hospital Safe from Disasters
During the World Conference on Disaster Reduction, held from 18 to 22 January
2005 in Kobe, Hyogo, Japan, the present framework was adopted for starting actions
in the period 2005-2015 with the aim to build the resilience of nations and commu-
nities to disasters [26]. The conference gave a unique opportunity to promote a
strategic and systematic approach to reducing vulnerabilities and risks to hazards
especially for the hospital sectors as reported by the following points extracted by
the original document:
• Integrate disaster risk reduction planning into the health sector; promote the
goal of “hospitals safe from disaster” by ensuring that all new hospitals are
built with a level of resilience that strengthens their capacity to remain func-
tional in disaster situations and implement mitigation measures to reinforce
existing health facilities, particularly those providing primary health care.
• Protect and strengthen critical public facilities and physical infrastructure,
particularly schools, clinics, hospitals, water and power plants, communica-
tions and transport lifelines, disaster warning and management centers, and
culturally important lands and structures through proper design, retrofitting
and re-building, in order to render them adequately resilient to hazards.
In the year 2006, the World Health Organization, Regional Office for Europe pub-
lished a handbook to provide to decision makers a practical guideline in assessing
the vulnerabilities of health facilities by identifying structural and functional gaps
and weaknesses [27]. The procedure takes into account the features characteristic
of Europe (such as the typical building types used for health facilities), employ
existing methods for assessing vulnerability, and use the latest version of the Euro-
pean Macroseismic Scale (EMS-98) for determining possible seismic demand. Three
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main vulnerability categories are evaluated, structural, nonstructural and adminis-
trative/organizational while in the annexes the evaluation forms for the rapid assess-
ment are reported. In the year 2008 the Western Pacific Part of the World Health
Organization and the Philippine Department of Health published a manual entitled
“Hospital should be safe from disasters” where are listed a set of indicators in order
to guide the hospital administrators to make hospitals safe from disaster through the
following definition [28]: a safe hospital will not collapse in disasters killing patients
and staff, will be able to function and supply critical services in emergencies and
will be organized with contingency plans in place and health personnel trained to
keep the network operational.
Finally, in the year 2009 the WHO Regional Office for South-East Asia published a
special issue volume entitled “World Health Day 2009 – Save lives: make hospital
safe in emergencies” where are reported some case studies on hospital vulnerability
assessment. The original contribution of the publication is the definition of a Hospi-
tal Safety Index (HSI)which quantitatively defines the minimum performance levels
and allows benchmarking amongst different health structures [29,30].
In conclusion the risk management in hospitals reported in the international guide-
line above is limited to the vulnerability assessment since any hazard analysis is
deeply carried out. According to the definitions in the glossary, the risk is evaluated
as a combination between the vulnerability of the system and the impact of the
hazard. Regarding the elements to be considered in the assessment, non-structural
components are considered as important as the structural elements and the internal
complexity of the system is cited as an important factor but non clearly described
(e.g. hospital internal connections) or explained especially for modern hospitals
where the functional or technological connections amongst the hospital systems are
more numerous, virtual and complicated to be detected. Only one of the guidelines
cited above refers to modern hospital vulnerability assessment [27]. In fact, in order
to complete the risk management process applied to hospitals, in the next para-
graphs the risk management chain will be described and adapted to the hospital
case.
1.2.3. The ’Critical Infrastructures’ Analysis
Currently, several models have been developed or modified for being applied to the
seismic risk assessment in hospitals. Most of them include models from the critical
infrastructure area [31] especially within the complex systems theory such as the
reliability analysis [32, 33, 34, 35, 36], the input-output analysis Leontief model
[37, 38, 39], from the network flow modeling [a,40] and the dynamic simulation
area[41]. With respect to the international WHO/UN guidelines (the check lists
and the evaluation forms are reported in the next paragraph), the models belonging
to the critical infrastructure analysis area are able to take the complexity of system
organization into account but they present some weakness such as they do not
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perform reliably enough with real data and their wide application to generic hospitals
is difficult, since the complexity level of the model construction make them too much
“single hospital oriented”. Moreover, they are complex and, in the risk management
application the more difficult is the method the least is used by the decision makers.
In addition, some of these models specifically focus on a specific aspect of the whole
system. For instance many studies include the water system as the only performance
indicator of a health facility during earthquakes [35] or they take into consideration
non-structural components only without any attention to the structural component.
On the other hand, some models are too generic and the hospital is seen just as a
node of the “n” elements composing the complex system [42]. Most of the times,
the disaster context is not analyzed but just cited as a selection key for choosing the
hazard to consider (e.g. earthquakes). Finally, as reported in the ISO standards, a
proper risk management process should consider the context analysis and adapt the
hospital system within the disaster context and using, as performance indicators,
both the strategic and hosting function of health structures.
1.2.4. The Risk Management Chain
1.2.4.1. General
The standardized methodology for risk management proposed within the Interna-
tional PhD program on “Mitigation of risk due to natural hazards on structures
and infrastructures” [a], aims to provide a methodological framework to support
risk managers in case of disasters which can result in serious damage to building,
infrastructure and communities. Given the broad nature of risk, the framework re-
ported in Figure 1.9 was organized for allowing its application to many scenarios.
Compared to the ISO standards, the framework is focused on the risk assessment
and risk treatment steps without providing any information on the “communication
and consultation” and the “establishing the context” phases while the risk identifi-
cation and risk monitoring are cited but not analyzed. On the other hand, for the
“operative steps” the typical modular approach given in [a] provides a clear order
and definition of the main actions to be carried out within a risk management pro-
cess, by providing which specific activities must be done according to the specific
purposes (risk analysis, risk evaluation or risk treatment). Moreover, risk analysis is
divided in 3 sub-actions which are: the hazard analysis, the damage assessment and
the loss assessment. Distinction between damage and loss is necessary in order to
apply the framework to systems not uniquely composed by physical elements, but
including other dimensions such as economic, human, cultural-social-historical and
ecological ones. The model shows how the connection between the hazard analysis
and the damage assessment is given by the structural vulnerability while the linkage
between the damage assessment and loss assessment is brought by the vulnerability
assessment of the whole system. Important aspects regarding with the risk evalu-
ation are the grading phase and the necessity to individuate measurable indicators
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to prioritize the risk levels. The grading part is essential for the next phase the
risk treatment. This is due to the fact that decisions most likely depend on the
level of the risk assessed which can be considered acceptable, rejected transferred
or mitigated. According to the mitigation sub-step, the mitigating actions can be
carried out at different phases of the project implementation or of the cycle of life
of the system analyzed. Especially considering the disaster cycle [43], risk reduction
activities can be made pre-disaster as prevention for improving resilience (physical)
and/or preparedness (organizational) of the system. During the disaster, actions
can be carried out with the aim to increase and improve the capacity to cope of
the system while after the event measures can be taken for minimizing the recovery
time and cost. Finally, the specific terms which are clearly defined in the risk man-
agement chain [a], see figure 1.9, allow a precise use and comparison between the
different areas of application by avoiding the risk of misunderstanding between, for
instance, the scientific and social contexts.
Figure 1.9.: The Risk management chain [a].
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1.2.4.2. Application to Hospitals
The aimed development of a methodology for risk mitigation in hospitals according
to the risk management chain reported in figure 1.9, must take into consideration
the following main steps: risk identification, risk assessment and risk treatment.
a. Risk identification
Earthquake risk is identified as the most relevant risk for hospitals as stated in the
WHO/UN international guidelines [30]. Moreover, earthquakes represent the worst
case scenario for health facilities since it is responsible for internal and external
damages and causing high medical need in the local population.
b. Risk assessment
For the risk assessment two main steps are identified: risk analysis and risk evalu-
ation. As reported in figure 1.10 (red), the risk management process used in this
work consist of a hazard analysis by defining the impact of the earthquake in terms
of hospital input as local medical demand (earthquake scenario) and the system vul-
nerability assessment. Risk analysis takes into account the complexity of the system
(critical infrastructure analysis) as well as both the structural and non-structural
aspects (WHO/PAHO international guidelines for vulnerability assessment) by pro-
viding the potential losses in terms of hospital performance degradation. For the
risk evaluation, the grading step needs to use specific performance indices in order
to have a quantitative evaluation for analyzing the residual hospital capacity (loss
assessment) after the seismic impact on the system (hazard analysis).
Figure 1.10.: Risk assessment phase proposed for the hospital case.
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c. Risk treatment
Once the risk assessment is completed, it is possible to move on to the risk treatment
step which includes the risk reduction phase. Since the aim of this dissertation
is developing the preventive measures to be taken to mitigate the seismic risk in
hospitals, only a partial part of the risk treatment part, reported in the management
chain, is analyzed, see figure 1.11. In the decision phase, although all the suggested
interventions are preventively planned to reduce the impact of the earthquake, some
of them find their application in the coping phase during the acute response phase.
Figure 1.11.: Risk treatment phase proposed for the hospital case.
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2. Seismic Vulnerability Assessment
2.1. Overview
The following chapter reports the development of the methodology regarding with
the hospital vulnerability assessment. According to the risk management chain ap-
plied to the hospital case study, the specific techniques chosen for the vulnerability
assessment are described and implemented especially for those methods coming from
rapid visual evaluation and the complex system theory. After a first introduction
of the rapid seismic evaluation, two different models for the hospital vulnerabil-
ity assessment are implemented: the Leontief model and the Fault Tree Analysis
(FTA). Finally, in order to compare the models, after the estimation of the hospital
performances in aftermath of an earthquake, a sensitivity analysis is carried out.
2.2. Rapid Vulnerability Evaluation
2.2.1. General
According to the current state of art, the seismic vulnerability evaluation of health fa-
cilities is a process including three main evaluations on structural and non-structural
aspects. The Hospital Vulnerability Evaluation (HVE) method proposed by the
WHO regional office Europe [27] is a hybrid, mainly qualitative method using rapid
visual screening combined with the screener’s judgments. The model, integrated
with the seismic regulation specification [46, 47], has been chosen for the applica-
tion to modern hospitals since it is specifically designed for European facilities. As
reported in figure 2.1 the evaluation process depends on the seismicity level and it
combines evaluation methods for the three main vulnerability categories: structural,
non-structural and organizational aspects.
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Figure 2.1.: TheHVE method [27].
The rapid visual screening is based on a “sidewalk survey” of buildings, using several
data collection forms filled out by screeners. Then, the data are processed and cor-
responding vulnerability indices, risk ratings or screener judgments, are calculated
or assigned in order to evaluate the facility according to structural, non-structural
and administrative/organizational vulnerability. Then with the use of vulnerabil-
ity/performance interrelation matrix, it is possible to get the performance level
associated to the correspondent vulnerability grade, see table 2.1.
Table 2.1.: Vulnerability – performance interrelation matrix [27].
The HVE method takes into account the features distinctive of Europe, such as
the predominant building typology used for health facilities, and relies on existing
vulnerability assessment methods and the European Macro-seismic Scale (EMS-
98)[46] for determining possible seismic demand. Following are described differ-
ent type of vulnerability evaluation: structural, non-structural and administra-
tive/organizational. Before getting into the structural vulnerability assessment,
some general info need to be recorded such as:
• Contacts, name and location of the hospital;
• Number of buildings;
• Clinical specialization in each building.
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2.2.2. Structural evaluation
Structural vulnerability is assessed by considering those construction parameters
which are easy to be evaluated by the screeners. The parameters are reported as
follows:
• General info: Number of stories, type of material and year of construction;
• Structure: Torsional behavior, existing damages, soft story, heavy floor, su-
perimposed floor, short column effect and pounding effect;
• Geology: sloping ground and type of soil. Beginning with the torsional behav-
ior, this is due to the building configuration. In fact, torsion is produced by the
eccentricity existing between the center of mass and the center of stiffness and
it is the cause of major damage to buildings subjected to strong earthquakes,
ranging from visible distortion of the structure (and its resultant loss of image
and reliability) to structural collapse.
The complex or simple building configurations regarding with the building shape, the
plant and the symmetry must be analyzed in order to assess a potential torsional
behavior. Figure 2.2 reports the irregular configuration for the symmetry for both
axes lateral and longitudinal.
Figure 2.2.: Regular and irregular building configuration [27].
In order to rapidly assess the plan and the elevation simplicity, which are responsible
of increasing the torsional behavior of buildings, figure 2.3 reports a sample of the
most common simple or complex plans and/or elevation configurations. This should
permit an easier and more immediate classification of the screened building which
shouldn’t necessarily involve expert personnel as screeners.
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Figure 2.3.: Sample of simple and complex plans and elevation configurations [25].
Moreover, figure 2.4 samples irregular story configuration or non-uniform mass dis-
tribution since they could be responsible for potential torsional behavior of the
building.
Figure 2.4.: Sample unusually story configuration or mass distribution [25].
Last elements taken into consideration for increasing the torsional behavior in build-
ings are both the positioning of the stiff elements asymmetrically with respect to
the center of gravity of the story and the placement of large masses asymmetrically
with respect to stiffness, see figure 2.5.
Figure 2.5.: Torsional behavior: asymmetric mass distribution [25].
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The next parameter to be assessed for the physical vulnerability is the structural
performance degradation which is evaluated by the presence of any visual damage.
The damage must be considered in accordance to the construction material of the
building: masonry or concrete. In masonry buildings, high attention is given to the
deterioration of concrete or reinforcing steel in any of the vertical- or lateral-force-
resisting elements and deterioration of masonry units. Regarding the masonry joints
deterioration, the mortar shall not be easily scraped away from the joints by hand
with a metal tool and there shall be no areas of eroded mortar. Finally, there shall
be no existing diagonal cracks in wall elements greater than 1/16mm or out-of-plane
offsets in the bed joint greater than 1/16 mm. In reinforced concrete buildings,
the deterioration of concrete shall be no visible, neither in reinforcing steel nor in
any of the vertical- or lateral-force-resisting elements. No deterioration of masonry
units shall be visible and for the masonry joints, the mortar shall not be easily
scraped away from the joints by hand with a metal tool and there shall be no areas
of eroded mortar. In addition there shall be no existing diagonal cracks in infill
walls that extend throughout a panel, greater than 1/16 mm, or have out of- plane
offsets in the bed joint greater than 1/16 mm. Finally, there shall be no existing
diagonal cracks wider than 1/16 mm in concrete columns that encase masonry infill.
Another parameter to take into consideration for the visual evaluation assessment is
the soft stories effect. Several types of architectural and structural plans lead to the
formation of so-called "soft" stories, which are more vulnerable to seismic damage
than others due to the fact that they are less stiff, less resistant, or both [25]. The
effect depends on the differences in height between floors or/and the interruption of
the elements composing the vertical structure of the building, see figure 2.6. The soft
storey can be at any level of the building, ground floor (1) and/or at the intermediate
level (2).
Figure 2.6.: Representation of building affected by the soft storey effect [25.]
Regarding with the heavy floor effect, mass irregularities can be detected by the com-
parison of story weights. The effective mass consists of the dead load of the structure
on each level plus the actual weight of partitions and permanent equipment on each
floor. The validity of this approximation is dependent upon the vertical distribution
of mass and stiffness in the building. Heavy roof/floor can be determined by the
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analysis of the following points: presence in the floor of heavy walls or of heavy
non-structural elements (e.g. presence of heavy equipment or architectural elements
such as tanks and antennas on the roof) such as the weight can be estimated as less
or more than 50% of the adjacent floors. Furthermore, other aspects which must
be considered are the thickness of the floor diaphragm with respect to the adjacent
floors and all those elements forming mass irregularities [21]. Moreover, the super-
imposed floor is a critical situation for the building seismic response similar to the
heavy floor/roof and it consists of the addition of a floor after the building construc-
tion. Sometimes lack of documentation makes this situation hard to be detected.
Only different construction materials or styles make it visible and evident. During
past earthquakes, reinforced concrete (RC) frame buildings that have columns of
different heights within one storey, suffered more damage in the shorter columns as
compared to taller columns of the same storey. Poor behavior of short column is
due to the fact that in an earthquake, a tall column and a short column of same
cross-section move horizontally by same amount ’∆’, see figure 2.7. However, the
short column is stiffer compared to the tall column and gets larger earthquake force.
Stiffness of a column means resistance to deformation – the larger is the stiffness,
the bigger is the force required to deform it. If a short column is not adequately
designed for such a big force, it can suffer significant damage during an earthquake.
This behavior is called Short Column Effect. The damage in these short columns
is often in the form of X-shaped cracking. This type of damage of columns is due
to shear failure within one storey, suffered more damage in the shorter columns as
compared to taller columns in the same storey [48, 49].
Figure 2.7.: Short column effect [48].
Another element to be considered in the structural assessment is the pounding ef-
fect between two or more buildings due to the mutual movement caused by the
seismic event. This behavior happens when buildings are built without sufficient
gaps between them and the interaction has not been considered. The buildings may
impact each other, or pound, during an earthquake. Building pounding can alter
the dynamic response of both buildings and impart additional inertial loads on both
structures. Buildings of the same height with matching floors will exhibit similar
dynamic behavior. If the buildings pound, floors will impact with other floors, which
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means that damage due to pounding usually will be limited to nonstructural com-
ponents. However, when the floors of adjacent buildings are at different elevations,
floors will impact with the columns of the adjacent building and that can cause
structural damage. Since neither building is designed for these conditions, there is
a potential for extensive damage and possible collapse [21], see figure 2.8.
Figure 2.8.: Pounding effects due to the seismic event [21]
Ground and geological aspects are important as well for the building seismic behavior
[21]. A sloping ground is clearly more dangerous for the buildings than a flat one.
One damage situation is represented by the necessity to use short columns to build
flatly floors in sloped grounds, see figure 2.9.
Figure 2.9.: Slope ground effect on the building seismic behavior.
Moreover, geological aspects are important also for what concerns the composition of
the ground where the building is located. Indeed, this is responsible for the seismic
energy propagation and amplification. According to the EC-8 definition [47], three
main soil types are classified:
1. Rock/hard soil condition: The geology least prone to cause damage to struc-
ture by earthquake shaking;
2. Medium soil condition: Prone to moderate shaking;
3. Soft soil condition: Behaves like jello by magnifying earthquakes waves.
Figure 2.10 and 2.11 report the structural evaluation forms suggested by theWHO/Europe
[27] which depend on the building type: masonry or reinforced concrete respectively.
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Figure 2.10.: Structural evaluation form for masonry buildings [27].
Figure 2.11.: Structural evaluation form for reinforced concrete buildings [27].
Finally, for the structural vulnerability grading is important to assess the expected
damage during earthquakes. Indeed, by defining the seismic effects on the hospital
it is possible to correlate the expected average damage µD with the magnitude
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classification reported by EMS-98 [46], the vulnerability level assessed (TVI) and
the specific seismic intensity (I), see equation below.
µD = 2.5× [1 + tanh(I + 0.25TVI − 13.1)÷ 2.3] (1)
TVI depends on the seismic building behavior [50] while µD depends on I and TVI.
Once obtained the correspondent µD to specific “I,” the damages can be connected to
the Total Vulnerability Index by following the ems-98 damage grades classification.
And by using table 2.2, it is possible to obtain, by using the µD value, the estimated
hospital performance (low, moderate, high).
Table 2.2.: Correlation table between TVI and performance level.
2.2.3. Non-structural evaluation
The rapid evaluation forms for non-structural aspects [27, 25, 21 ] include one form
for medical equipment and office furniture, one form for the basic installations and
one form for the architectonics and facades elements. Since in literature the forms
regarding medical equipment and basic installations are not detailed, two new forms
have been designed and added for a rapid non-structural vulnerability evaluation.
Table 2.3 reports the form for installations and systems vulnerability evaluation. It
takes into consideration the presence of the necessary elements for an appropriate
hospital performance and the subsequent risk to a seismic event. The risk is classified
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according to the severity of subsequences to the damage: life affecting (V), economic
loss (D) and operational loss (O).
Table 2.3.: Lifeline and basic installation vulnerability evaluation form.
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Regarding the medical devices vulnerability evaluation, the form is reported in table
2.4. It takes into account the presence of specific medical devices by classifying
them according to the destination of use: big therapeutic - diagnostic devices and
life support or emergency use equipment which defines those devices essential for
the hospital treatment activity during earthquakes.
Table 2.4.: Medical equipment evaluation form for vulnerability assessment.
According to the international guidelines described in chapter 2 [27-21] and the
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scientific literature [36, 51-55], it was found out that the level of performance of
medical equipment is strongly related to the level of fixing or anchorage to the
floor or to the walls pre event. Hence, for each listed device, the form takes into
consideration the quality of any fixing system applied to the device itself by the use
of three levels: “yes” for good quality fixing,” partial” for not adequate fixing and
“no” for any type of fixing applied to the medical device. The term “no device”
means that the medical equipment is not present in the hospital area.
2.2.4. Administrative/organizational evaluation
For the organizational vulnerability, the medical and clinical procedural planning
aspects must be considered. Especially for the medical treatment areas, a priority
index amongst the different clinical activities must be defined in order to properly
coping the emergency phase. According to the Pan American Organization [25],
table 2.5 defines priority index of each medical service which can be rated as: (1)
dispensable, (2) preferable, (3) necessary, (4) very necessary and (5) indispensable
in an emergency situation.
Table 2.5.: Priority definition of clinical activities during disasters [25].
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The subsequent designed form is reported in table 2.6. Number of beds and operat-
ing tables are essential information for estimating the ordinary hospital performance
and the potential degradation in aftermath of an earthquake. Detailed explanation
and definition on performance level will be given in the next paragraphs .The “build-
ing ID” permits to connect the medical activity to the specific seismic behavior of
the building.
Table 2.6.: Evaluation form for organizational vulnerability .
Moreover in the organizational vulnerability area, the remaining details must be
assessed:
• Appropriate number of personnel in relation to the estimated working load;
• Documentation (building certificates, maintenance reports, emergency plans,
etc..);
• Personnel training (drills and exercitations).
2.2.5. Fire vulnerability assessment
Given the fact that in hospitals many occupants are non-self-sufficient people and
they can’t autonomously move because of their temporary or permanent physical
disability or the necessity (for some of them) to be life-dependent on technology
support, a particular attention to fire risk assessment in hospital must be paid. Ac-
cording to the scientific literature, the research focused on the phenomena regarding
the “Fires Following Earthquakes (FFE)” in Hospitals [56-75] which demonstrates
how the fire risk increases after an earthquake. Moreover fire risk can determine the
loss of very expensive equipment and the interruption of the clinical activity. So, in
order to resume the severe subsequence of fire in hospitals, the severity is assessed
as follows:
• Difficulties for the evacuation of not self-sufficient people;
• Loss of very expensive equipment;
• Continuity of the main clinical activities.
For the reasons above, a new form was designed with the aim to assess the fire
vulnerability in health structures after a seismic event, see table 2.7. The FFE
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vulnerability assessment form is divided in four main sections: ignition, evacuation,
protection and suppression vulnerability.
Table 2.7.: Fire Following Earthquake (FFE) vulnerability evaluation form.
Each form corresponds to a specific destination of use located in a specific area of the
building. This permits to compare collected data with the referring values reported
in table 2.8 which suggests which medical activity must be placed to the ground
floor in relation to the occupants’ safety and security. Moreover, the appropriate
types of specific warning alarms (WA), according to the medical areas, are indicated
in table 2.8 as well.
Once all the vulnerabilities assessments have been completed (structural, non-structural,
organizational and fire risk) for each hospital building, the remaining part for a
proper system vulnerability assessment especially for modern hospitals, consists of
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understanding how all the different area and parts are mutual connected and how
a damage or degradation can propagate in the system and causing what kind of
degradation in the hospital performance The application of the critical infrastruc-
ture theory especially for what concerns the complex system modeling has been
applied to the hospital case study as described in the following section by the appli-
cation of two different models: the input-output inoperability Leontief model and
the Fault Tree Analysis.
Table 2.8.: Suggested floor level and warning alarms according to the specific med-
ical area.
2.3. Hospital System Analysis
2.3.1. Overview
A hospital is considered a complex system [32, 50]. According to the scientific
literature two main models have been chosen to analyze the hospital system: the
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Leontief model and the Fault Tree Analysis [32, 34, 36]. In the following paragraphs
both models are developed according to the hospital system characteristics.
2.3.2. The Input - Output Inoperability Leontief Model
2.3.2.1. General
Hospitals are complex systems defined as critical infrastructures. With the term
“Critical Infrastructure” is intended that part of the socio-economic system on
which functions that sustain life, commerce and human activities depend. It is
critical in the sense that the failure of any of its principal components can lead
to knock-on effects upon other systems. For example, loss of electrical power can
compromise many systems from, railways to traffic lights, and thus lead to progres-
sive break-down of the socio-economic system. Critical infrastructures usually have
weaknesses, or points of maximum vulnerability, which are especially susceptible to
failure, or that represent points where failure would have the greatest consequences.
The Leontief model enables one to analyse critical infrastructures in conjunction
with one another and to test hypotheses about the knock-on effects of failure. It
is thus a powerful tool for the study of vulnerability in terms of cascading failures
and their potential consequences. A critical infrastructure is operationally defined
as a complex system formed by its own structure, technologies and personnel. When
it is temporarily interrupted it can significantly disturb a society at the local, na-
tional and even international levels. In recent years these social and technological
infrastructures have become increasingly complex by forming mutual dependencies
and interdependences, especially with an increasing use of information technology
and communications. Improvement in the quality of services and reduction in costs
can lead to the emergence of new and unforeseen vulnerabilities. Closely linked
infrastructures tend to be highly vulnerable to the propagation of faults. A fail-
ure in one part of the network can easily spread by a "domino effect" mechanism
throughout the whole system with impacts on its functionality and geography. This
can amplify the effects and cause malfunctions and failures that affect even remote
users, as may occur, for example, in a health system. The Wassily Leontief model
on the balance of economic systems forms the basis of the input-output model of
inoperability (IIM Inoperability Input-Output Model) that was developed by Ya-
cov, Haimes and Jiang (2001) and is used for complex infrastructure analysis. The
application of this model to the description of complex systems such as hospitals
aims to simulate their behaviour in case of an external event or failure by carrying
out a vulnerability assessment that takes into consideration how a specific failure
can influence functionality of the whole system. Furthermore, this tool allows stake-
holder opinions and experience to be taken into account and thus improves the more
reliability of the model of the system. The model describes a method for analyzing
the impact of an event (i.e. a failure) and its propagation to connected systems by
estimating the impact of the initial event on the operations of the infrastructure.
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It takes into consideration the elements that make up the system, together with
their mutual interdependencies. It does so by considering the direction of functional
impacts (element “a” is essential to the performance of element “b,” but element
“a” is not influenced at all by the operational level of element “b”). In other words,
the model aims to analyze how the inoperability of one part of the system (i.e., its
inability to perform tasks that it is directed to do) is propagated to the other system
elements. The model quantifies the subsequent inoperability of the infrastructure,
where ’inoperability of a system’ is defined as its inability to perform completely its
proper functions. The inoperability is quantified as a value between zero and one,
where zero corresponding to a perfect performance at the operational level and one
refers to complete ineffectiveness of the system (i.e., 100% inoperability). Yacov,
Haims and Jiang (2001) defined the input-output model as follows:
• xj - overall risk of ineffectiveness of the jth interconnected infrastructure that
can be caused by one or more failures;
• ri - the ith resource to manage the risk of ineffectiveness of the specific critical
infrastructure due to the general complexity of the system;
• xkj - the degree of subsequent ineffectiveness of the kth infrastructure due to
one or more multiple failures caused by the jth interconnected infrastructure
element;
• akj - a weight representing the influence that the jthinfrastructure has on the
ineffectiveness of the interconnected kth infrastructure, due to the type and
strength of their interconnection: its values form the interdependencies coeffi-
cient of matrix A.
Haims and Jiang also consider akk = 0 for ∀ k, so as to exclude from the Leontief
matrix all those effects caused by the failure of the infrastructure upon itself. Fur-
thermore, the vector of failures c is defined as the percentages of inoperability of all
the elements k of the system at the initial time t=0 due to the external disturbance
at the system by factors such as natural disaster or accidents. The basic equation
of the Leontief model is given in the following equation 2:
Xk =
n∑
k=1
akjxj + ck (2)
The next expression deals with the same model using the matrix form (3):
 x1...
xn
 =
 a11 ... a1n... ... ...
an1 ... ann

 x1...
xn
+
 c1...
cn
 (3)
Equation (4) gives the synthetic form:
X = AX + c (4)
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in which all the elements are non-negative (0≤ Xi ≤1). By assuming that matrix
(I-A) is not singular, equation (4) can also be written as follows:
(I − A)X = c (5)
The subsequent degree of ineffectiveness can be calculated as follows:
X = c (I − A)− 1 (6)
By using the matrix form reported in equation (7):
X = (I − A)−1 c =


1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
−

a00 a01 ... a0n
a10 a11 ... a1n
... ... ... ...
an0 an1 ... ann


−1
c0
c1
...
cn
 (7)
When the system is in perfect condition, or under conditions in which all components
are operating fully, we have xk = 0 for every k and
∑xk= 0.
The last step is to determine the coefficients of the input-output matrix. This is
the most difficult part of the modelling process, and will now be described in detail.
Matrix A plays a central role in defining the problem and some indicators can be
defined in order to characterise it. The first of these is the dependency index, which
is defined as follows:
δi =
∑
j aij (8)
This is unique for every element or infrastructure that comprises the general system.
It is calculated as the sum of row elements in matrix A, and it gives a measure of the
strength of the ith element compared to the inoperability of all others. A dependency
index of less than one means that the infrastructure still preserves some operational
capability in spite of the overall ineffectiveness of the system. In contrast, an index of
inoperability greater than one indicates that the specific element or infrastructure is
strongly dependent to other elements or infrastructures and can be totally ineffective
as a result of the ineffectiveness of other elements.
The second indicator represents the influence that a specific infrastructure has on
the entire system: the influence gain. It is defined as the column sums of matrix A
coefficients. The influence gain provides a measure of how critical the services of the
specific infrastructure are to the functionality of other system elements. A high index
of dependency indicates that inefficiencies of a specific infrastructure, even when
they are small, exert a strong influence and can lead to the inoperability of other
infrastructures. A low value means that the ineffectiveness of the jth infrastructure
has little effect on the operational capacity of the others.
ρj =
∑
i aij (9)
Finally, it is important to highlight that the use of the Leontief model implies that
a unique non-negative solution exists.
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2.3.2.2. Analysis of interdependencies
One of the most critical steps in building the input-output inoperability model is to
determine the coefficients of the Leontief matrix A. In order to obtain a complete
and reliable model it is essential to perform a thorough analysis of interdependencies
among the infrastructures. In other words, the interdependency term must consider
any type of dependency between two or more infrastructures. In order to evaluate
the hospital performances in aftermath of an earthquake, the critical path strategy
has been followed which consists of considering only the medical areas rated as
“indispensable” reported in table 2.5 [25] (from element “A” to element “G) besides
the technical systems and medical equipment (from element “H” to element “R”).
A total of sixteen elements have to be considered in the Leontief Model development
for seismic vulnerability assessment as follows:
1. Emergency department;
2. Diagnostic & Lab;
3. Surgical operation;
4. ICU;
5. Inpatient ward;
6. Morgue;
7. Special assistance (urology, pediatry,etc..);
8. Chrisis room;
9. Internal connection (lifts, viability, etc..);
10. Power network;
11. Gas network;
12. Hydric network;
13. HIS;
14. Fire system;
15. Equipment;
16. Accessibility.
One of the main approaches to analyzing complex interdependencies and subsequent
definitions of the Leontief matrix coefficients is agent-based modelling. The basic
idea behind this approach is to model the general system by using a ’bottom-up’
analysis. The modelling process includes study of the behavior of the individual
components and the trajectory of the whole system when these components start
to interact. In this context, the individual components are defined as single entities
characterised by location, capacity and memory. The location of an entity is defined
as the physical space in which it is located. The capability of an entity expresses
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what it is able to do. The memory represents its current state and operational
history, such as its propensity to overload or aging. An alternative approach is based
on building a knowledge base through the compilation of technical questionnaires.
In particular, technical information is gathered through a series of questionnaires
submitted to experts. By considering different durations of failure, the questions
seek to understand the dynamics of failure propagation and the impact that failure
in a specific infrastructure will have on the others. Hence, in order to ensure the
correct interpretation of uncertain data, the methodology uses a fuzzy logic system
that takes into consideration both the experience of the user and the degree of
confidence placed in the answer.
2.3.2.3. Fuzzy logic questionnaire
A fuzzy logic questionnaire has been developed for the determination of the Leontief
coefficients aij. The values obtained are weighted on both experts’ certainty and
expertise, see figure 2.12. The value aij is comparable to a triangular area where
the mean value at the base represents the chosen value by the expert, the base
width depends on the grade of certainty while the height is defined according to the
expertize level of the interviewed.
Figure 2.12.: Triangular value according the fuzzy logic theory.
Every expert’s interview is described by a specific membership function which is
combined with the others’ functions in order to get one general value for opinion,
see figure 2.13. The general value is obtained by combining the red and the blue
functions.
52
2.3 Hospital System Analysis
Figure 2.13.: General value as combination of membership functions.
Once the interviews are completed, a validation process is necessary to control if
the obtained coefficients are all acceptable as similar to the general trend or if the
general output is just a mathematical result. The statistical analysis chosen for
the validation consists of a t-test (ANOVA and Fisher Least Significant Difference)
applied to both the experts and to the opinions in order to declare which values
can’t be acceptable.
2.3.2.4. The Input Inoperability vector
The input inoperability vector represents the level of inoperability of the hospital
systems after an earthquake and it is the input to the Leontief model. The definition
of the inoperability vector depends on the vulnerability level assessed by the evalu-
ation forms at a specific seismic magnitude. The degradation levels used to define
the hospital area performance in the aftermath of an earthquake are as follows [32]:
high vulnerability= 0.3, medium vulnerability=0.1 and low vulnerability = 0.03.
Finally, figure 2.14 summarizes the Leontief model structure and the procedure to
carry out.
Figure 2.14.: Leontief model application.
From right to left in the picture, firstly it is the inoperability vector definition by
the rapid vulnerability evaluation forms, secondary is the questionnaire interview
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for the matrix “A” coefficients’ definition. The output vector is the hospital system
inoperability with all the degradation degrees for each medical area.
2.3.3. FTA Model
The Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is a top-down, deductive failure analysis in which
the reliability of a System (Top Event) is assessed by using a boolean logic to
combine a series of basic simple events (the fault’s leaves) [76]. The FTA was
originally developed in 1962 by the Bell Laboratories by H.A. Watson for military
purposes. Following the main FTA applications have been regarding to complex
systems analysis such as civil and military aircrafts’ equipment and the nuclear
power industry. Safety and reliability aspects are the main application fields of
the Fault Tree Analysis. FTA in reliability Engineering can be used for designing
safely systems (by identifying potential causes of failure) and for systems’ breakdown
prediction and diagnosis. Moreover, the FTA allows investigating the consequences
of an initial event to the top event of the system analyzed. In other words, by
the failure probability of the basic elements, the top event probability of failure is
estimated by taking into consideration the elements distribution as well. Hence FTA
is used to calculate the overall probability of failure of a system with the reduction of
the system to a group of both serial and redundant sections. The presence of parallel
elements makes the system more reliable and the probability of failure decreases,
see figure 2.15a. On the other hand, the presence of serial elements’ distribution in
the general system makes the top event probability of failure increasing, see figure
2.15b.
Figure 2.15.: Fault Tree Analysis configuration. (a) Parallel distribution; (b) Se-
rial distribution.
With the term Reliability ‘R’ is intended the total number of working pieces divided
by the total number of pieces checked out. The relationship between the Reliability
’R’ and the Unavailability ‘Q’ of an element is described in equation 10:
R = 1−Q (10)
The mathematical formulas to estimate the top event reliability depends on the
elements’ distribution, parallel or serial. In figure 2.16a is reported the calculation
in case of parallel system (AND boolean operator) while in figure 2.16b is reported
the serial configuration (OR boolean operator).
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Figure 2.16.: FTA boolean calculation. (a) parallel system; (b) Serial system.
For a hospital system, the top event concerns the combination of different hospital
areas. As reported in figure 2.17, each hospital area performance depends on struc-
tural, non-structural and organizational components. Furthermore, non-structural
component depends on basic installations, medical equipment and architectonics re-
liability levels. The basic installations considered in the FTA hospital application
include the fire safety, the power distribution, the plumbing system, the medical gas
distribution and the internal and external viability. Each basic event failure prob-
ability is statistically independent of the others and each single failure probability
of the basic events is estimated by the field data collection by using the evaluation
forms described in the previous paragraphs. The values related to the vulnerability
levels assessment are as follows [32]: High vulnerability = 0.3, Medium = 0.1 and
Low vulnerability = 0.03.
Figure 2.17.: Hospital FTA.
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2.4. Hospital Performance Evaluation
Once the hospital system is defined and the evaluation forms are ready to be applied
in the field application, last step of the system vulnerability assessment is the defi-
nition of quantitative indicators which can be used as measurement of the hospital
performance. This permits to quantitatively determine the vulnerability level by
calculating its degradation as performance loss. According to scientific literature
[77, 36], the hospital performance can be assessed by the use of the Hospital Treat-
ment Capacity (HTC) which is defined as the number of surgical operation feasible
per hour by the hospital, see equation 11. The coefficients α and β define the staff
and organizational functionality (0-1), γ1 is the number of surgery tables, γ2 is the
surgery room performance (0-1) and Tm is the time necessary for a single treatment.
HTC = α× β (γ1 × γ2)÷ Tm (11)
In order to evaluate the index above, it is necessary to estimate the operating the-
aters’ performance by the reliability analysis of the appropriate medical areas and
the basic installations including the medical equipment availability. This calculation
only considers the strategic function of the hospital without considering the intrinsic
security of patients inside the structure. Especially for hospitals, this aspect should
be assessed as well because of the high presence of not self-sufficient people 24 hours
per day. Hence, a new index called Intrinsic Security (IS) has been developed, see
equation 12:
IS = α× β × [(γ3 × Γ2) + (γ4 × ρ2)]÷ (γ3 + γ4) (12)
Where the coefficients Γ2(0-1) and ρ2(0-1) define the performance of the in-patient
and ICU areas respectively. The evaluation of the hospital intrinsic security shall
consider both inpatient and ICU beds. For the inpatient beds (γ3) is necessary
to evaluate structural vulnerability and the fire safety according to direct risk and
unsafe evacuation. For the ICU beds (γ4), besides the structural vulnerability and
the fire safety, essential role is played by medical equipment and basic installations
as well. Patients connected to life support devices and difficult to move represent
the most critical situation in terms of intrinsic risk in hospitals.
56
3. Seismic Risk Assessment
3.1. Overview
As reported in the glossary, the risk assessment formula chosen in this dissertation
is given by the combination of system vulnerability (V) and the considered hazard
(H), see equation 13:
RISK (R) = V ulnerability (V )×Hazard (H) (13)
For this reason, the hospital risk assessment methodology developed aims to com-
plete first the system vulnerability assessment procedure and next to include the
evaluation of the seismic impact on the health response performance. This is essen-
tial in order to find out the necessary procedures for the further risk mitigation.
3.2. Hazard Analysis
According to the risk management chain, the hazard analysis can be completed
with the loss assessment obtained from the hazard impact analysis on both the
local context (number of casualties) and the hospital system (performance degra-
dation). In order to assess the seismic impact on the medical context, the number
of severe injured people which need surgical care after an earthquake is considered.
Many indices existed such as the Hospital Surgical Capacity (HSC) [28] which is the
number of seriously injured patients that can be operated upon within a 12-hour
period or the Hospital Treatment Demand (HTD) [77]. Another index, the Hospital
Treatment Demand (HTD), has been chosen because it is easier to be evaluated by
considering the estimation of the total number of yellow and red tagged injured as
defined in equation 14:
HTD = j ×NT1+T2 (14)
Where T1 and T2 are the red and yellow tagged injured people respectively during
the triage while “j” is a constant considering which proportion of patients classified
as T1 and T2 needs surgical intervention. According to the literature [36] a value
of J=1/3 has been considered in this study.
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Furthermore, in order to quantify the amount of surgical demand per specific hos-
pital, a new index HTDHOSPITAL has been developed. It is evaluated under the
hypothesis to have a uniform distribution of casualties’ hospitalization and mea-
sures the medium horary surgical load per hospital. As reported in equation 15, the
index takes into consideration ten hours as the acute emergency period. This choice
is due to the fact that this dissertation aims to analyze the hospital performances
in aftermath of the disaster only.
HTDHOSPITAL = [(HTD ÷ number of hospitals)÷ 10hours] (15)
The only question still open is whether the capacity of the hospital system in after-
math of a seismic event will be able to successfully satisfy the local medical need.
In order to answer this question, the next section describes how to quantify and
analyze the residual hospital performance assessment at a specific seismic condition.
3.3. Risk Assessment
In order to analyze the hospital capacity of treatment in a specific seismic scenario,
the HTC is divided by the HTDHOSPITALand provides a sort of indicator which is
able to provide a numerical estimation on the capacity of the hospital to comply
with the local health demand, see equation 16. The new index is called the Hospital
Treatment Capacity Indicator (HTCI) and when the medical needs are complied,
the HTCI assumes the value “1”.
HTCI = HTC ÷HTDHOSPITAL (16)
Once the HTCI is evaluated, it is possible to estimate the Hospital Performance
Index (HPI) which is defined as a linear combination between the numerical values
given by the capacity of the hospital to treat and its intrinsic security (IS), see
equation 17.
HPI = [(HTCI × η) + (IS × θ)]÷ (η + θ) (17)
Where the coefficients η and θ depend on the hospital type as follows:
• City Hospital: η = 3 and θ= 2;
• Country Hospital: η = 2 and θ= 3;
• Small City Hospital: η = 2 and θ= 2.
The meaning of assigning different values for the coefficients η and θ is related to
the specific context where the hospital is situated, which can be more important for
strategic functions (city hospital) than hosting purposes of the facility (country hos-
pital) or the other way around. Usually country hospitals are built with the aim to
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serve many different surrounding villages and are located in an intermediate position
easy to reach by the most of the villages themselves. During an earthquake, road
viability can be interrupted and the injured people locally treated by field medical
installation or aerial evacuated to other hospitals in the safe areas as the strategic
function of this hospital type is not really important. Moreover, by considering the
high concentration in one facility of hospital patients (coming from the villages), the
risk of structural collapse which could make hospital as the most numerous point of
severe injured people must be avoided. For this reason, the hosting function of this
hospital type must be predominant than the strategic one. For small city hospitals,
the η and θ values define a “middle scenario” where any specific function of the
health structure is considered predominant to the other.
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4. Seismic Risk Mtitgation
4.1. Response and Prevention
According to the risk management chain, the risk treatment part applied to the
hospital case study takes into consideration two main areas of intervention according
to the effects on the disaster cycle phases, which are in this specific dissertation the
prevention and the response.
In the following chapter the terminology used tends to underline more the type of
intervention instead of the phase of the expected effects. The defined measures are
classified in:
• direct interventions: include all those measures to be carried out directly to
the hospital system;
• indirect interventions: include all those actions on other systems involved in
the medical response chain.
Although this light difference in the approach, it is clear how the direct interventions
can be linked to the preventions phase while the indirect ones belong to the coping
phase during disasters. Finally, a cost analysis is carried out according to the actions
type.
4.2. Direct Actions
According to the direct measures on the hospital system, four different types of
actions have been defined:
• Type 1: interventions on emergency planning and organizational aspects;
• Type 2: actions on medical equipment and architectural elements;
• Type 3: measures on basic installations;
• Type 4: actions on medical personnel;
• Type 5: structural retrofitting.
Type 1
The actions involved in this category are supposed to make part of the ordinary
activity of the hospital and they include the development of emergency plans for
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seismic risk (in this specific case) and the management of emergency department
overcrowding scenario, besides the periodic organization of drills and evacuation
simulation. In addition this type of interventions includes the change of destination
of use of existing hospital areas such as the goal of empowering the surgical capacity.
Type 1 actions can be limited to the hospital scale or including the whole participants
to the medical response chain.
Type 2
Many references [22, 23] suggest proper non-structural components anchorage and
fixing for hospitals. For instance, figure 4.1 reports a specific form from the Cal-
ifornia Building Code (CBC 2010) with the definition of specific seismic measures
which can be carried out for equipment and basic installation anchorage and fix-
ing [78]. The seismic certification of non-structural components is already present
in the IBC 2009 Section 1708.4 [79] which is the base for the CBC 2010 section
1708A.4 while the special certification for designated seismic systems is contained
in the ASCE 7-05 section 13.2.2 [80]. Moreover, in the CBC 2010 Section 1708A.4.1
are listed the components and equipment which need to comply with the specific
seismic certification:
1. Emergency and standby power systems;
2. Elevator equipment (excluding elevator cabs);
3. Components with hazardous contents;
4. Smoke control fans;
5. Exhaust fans;
6. Switchgear;
7. Motor control centers;
8. X-Ray machines in fluoroscopy rooms;
9. CT (Computerized Tomography) Scanners;
10. Air conditioning units;
11. Air handling units;
12. Chillers;
13. Cooling Towers;
14. Transformers;
15. Electrical substations;
16. UPS and batteries;
17. Distribution panels;
18. Control panels.
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The following components are exempt from special seismic certification:
1. Equipment and components installed in non-conforming buildings;
2. Equipment and components weighting not more than 20lbs and supported
directly on structures (not mounted on other equipment or components).
Emergency plans development are considered at null cost for the structure while
the medical equipment and architectural elements fixing is considered the cheapest
mitigation action to be carried out in a health structure.
Figure 4.1.: Approved equipment anchorage in CBC 2010.
Type 3
The basic installation related actions regard the systems’ elements anchorage, the
safe storage of some essential and dangerous elements (as GPL cylinders for the back-
up generator or medical gas cylinders), the use of flexible pipes and connections for
the medical gas and plumbing system pipes and building redundant systems. Flexi-
ble connections are suggested for reducing the seismic risk, see figure 4.2, especially
when passing from one building to an other one and for those life support related sys-
tems such as power system and medical gas. Furthermore, special attention should
be given to those pipes containing inflammables such as the oil supply for back-up
generator.
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Figure 4.2.: Example of flexible connection.
Regarding the anchorage of the basic installations and architectonics elements, table
4.1 reports which non-structural elements have to be considered in the seismic risk
mitigation [22].
Table 4.1.: Anchorage of non-structural elements [22].
Type 4
Type 4 takes into account the personnel related actions such as the assumption of
new medical resources.
Type 5
Type 5 interventions include the structural retrofitting on the building such as the
substitution of a heavy tile roof, which is more susceptible to movement during an
earthquake, by a lighter and safer roof and/or reinforcement and strengthening of
walls by covering their surfaces with wire mesh and filling with cement.
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4.3. Indirect Actions
With the term “indirect actions” is intended all that group of interventions involving
other institutions and resources involved in the medical response chain supporting
the health structures. In this dissertation they include field hospitals (figure 4.3a) or
more in general mobile medical clinics (figure 4.3b) which are managed by the local
or national civil protection offices or by NGOs and institutional rescuing association
such as the Red Cross.
Figure 4.3.: (a)Example of field hospital [81]; (b)Example of mobile medical shelter
[82].
Moreover, other indirect intervention regard the medical evacuation by air to other
structures, see figure 4.4. For instance in case of the L’Aquila earthquake (Italy,
2009) all the indirect interventions above have been largely used in the aftermath
of the earthquake for the management of the acute care medical response “Within
24 hours it was completely replaced by the first of two field hospitals that arrived
in the area. Meanwhile, early management of casualties was largely in the hands of
the Italian armed forces, which employed "Medevac" aerial evacuation techniques to
remove seriously injured patients to hospitals outside the disaster area [83]”.
Figure 4.4.: Example of Medevac.
As summary, the following types of indirect interventions have been analyzed:
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• Type 1: mobile medical unit installation;
• Type 2: medical aerial evacuation of casualties to hospitals outside the disaster
area.
4.4. Cost Assessment
4.4.1. Overview
The estimated costs depend on the specific intervention since for each retrofitting
type different material, personnel and duration are involved. Following is presented
a cost analysis including the single cost per type of intervention and category: direct
and indirect measures.
4.4.2. Cost Analysis of Direct Actions
According to the literature [84-89] and subsequent validation by experts’ opinion,
the economic costs are reported below. For type 1 interventions, it was chosen to
consider those actions free cost for the hospital since they belong to the ordinary
activity of facility or institutional staff. Moreover type 2 and type 3 were considered
on a same specific cost category since despite of different targets, the interventions
are considered the same for both types.
• Concerning type 2 and type 3 retrofitting, the succeeding cost estimations can
be defined as follows:
– Anchorage of medical equipment: 150 €/equipment;
– Elevators securing, anchorage of water and medical gas systems’ pipes,
back up generators and medical gas tanks: 2.5 €/m2.
• For type 4 actions, they have been considered both the cost of the additional
personnel to cover the operating theatres H24 and 7/7 (180.000€/year includ-
ing 1 surgeon and 1 anaesthetist) and the cost necessary for changing the
destination of use of a specific hospital area which includes the acquisition of
specific medical equipment (340.000€/surgery table, see table below [92]) and
the installation of specific lifeline systems [93, 94] (350.000€/table surgery[95]).
Please note that all costs refer to a single operating table.
• Type 5: with regards to the structural measures, the total costs are estimated
around 200€/m2which include following specific actions:
– Intervention with reinforced concrete partitions;
– Intervention with dissipative bracings;
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– Horizontal structures;
– Vertical structures;
– Foundations;
– Intervention of basic insulation.
Table 4.2.: Cost estimation of the technology dotation in surgery room.
The lifeline and structural costs for installing a surgery room, within an already
existing area in the hospital, are estimated by the necessity to guarantee functional
efficiency and safety. For this reason operating rooms require special systems which
are designed for providing the permanent continuity of medical gases, thermal com-
fort and power distribution. Moreover, air system is essential for surgery room
hygiene (protective against postoperative infections). Electrical safety requires all
the technical features to avoid micro shock and power disruptions [93] while the
presence of separated paths of dirty and clean areas is essential. Particular atten-
tion is also given to specific procedures and disposals for special waste, see table
4.3.
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Table 4.3.: Non-structural aspects for surgery room installation.
4.4.3. Cost Analysis of Indirect Actions
The economic evaluation of in direct methods involves both the estimated costs of
air-transporting the patient to an other facility and those related to transportation
and installation of mobile medical units (shelter or tent). In particular, the choice
of considering air-transportation was taken into consideration because the road vi-
ability conditions may not be practicable in aftermath of an earthquake. The cost
evaluation is analyzed as follows:
• Type 1: the cost of installing a mobile medical unit for field surgical treatment
per surgical table is estimated according to the type of unit: tent or shelter.
The cost of installing a shelter as mobile medical unit is around 415.000€
which includes the cost of the shelter (150.000€), the acquisition of medical
devices (264.000€) and the transportation (2€/km) [91]. A tent unit costs
around 223.000€ which is 9.000€ for the tent and 214.000€ for the medical
instrumentation acquisition. The lower cost of the instrumentation for tent
depends to the fact that a tent does not permit the installation of all equipment
available in a real operating room (or shelter) for poor technical and structural
standards.
• Type 2: medical aerial evacuation of casualties to hospitals outside the disaster
area. According to [90] a single evacuation costs around 5.000€ per patient.
It is important to remind how the analysis assumes only the coping phase. The
additional costs deriving from the casualties’ hospitalization have not been taken
into consideration in this cost assessment.
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5. Risk Assessment - Italian Case
Study (OSMA)
The following chapter reports the application of the risk assessment methodology
described in the previous chapters. The methodology has been tested to the Italian
context which consists of the OSMA hospital in Florence. The seismic scenario
is given by the 1919 Mugello earthquake which takes into consideration a seismic
magnitude I=6.
5.1. OSMA Hospital Description
The OSMA hospital (Ospedale di Santissima Maria Annunziata) is a Florentine
public health structure providing three hundred hospital beds and six operating
theatres. The hospital is situated at the south of Florence. Moreover, hospital
accessibility is available 24hours per day and besides the ordinary road access there
is a helicopter airstrip for the aerial transportation of casualties, see figure 5.1.
Figure 5.1.: OSMA hospital in Florence, Italy - [source: Googlemap].
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As reported in figure 5.2, the Florence OSMA hospital is divided in three main
buildings which are “building 1a (Lotto1)”, ”building 1c (Lotto2)” and the “corridor
1b (Collegamento).”
Figure 5.2.: OSMA hospital plant [Source: Florence Health System Technical
Dept.].
5.2. Seismic Vulnerability Assessment
According to the rapid evaluation forms described in chapter 2.1, the results are
presented in tables 5.1 and 5.2 by considering a seismic intensity I=6. Each build-
ing provides with a vulnerability estimation according to the different vulnerability
grades: Low (L), Medium (M) and High (H).
Table 5.1.: Results of the structural and non-structural vulnerability assessments
at the OSMA hospital.
Table 5.2.: Results of the administrative/organizational vulnerability assessment
at the OSMA hospital.
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Besides the administrative/organizational vulnerability, table 5.2 reports the number
of ordinary hospital beds belonging to Intensive Care Unit (ICU) and the number
of the operating tables. Both building 1A and 1C contain hospital beds (HB) while
operating tables (OT) and ICU beds are located in building 1C only.
Regarding the Leontief model application, five experts were interviewed for the
definition of the matrix coefficients and they included:
• 2 hospital engineers;
• 1 technical director;
• 1 physician;
• 1 health medical director.
The questionnaire consisted of 256 semi-structured questions and considered both
expertise and confidence levels. The expertise weighting range has been defined as
follows:
• technical director =1;
• medical director = 0.75;
• hospital engineer = 0.5;
• hospital physician = 0.3.
While for the confidence levels on the requested opinion:
• strongly agree: =1;
• more agree than disagree = 0.95;
• no opinion = 0.90;
• more disagree than agree = 0.85.
• strongly disagree = 0.80.
Finally for the single values which compose the single expert’s matrix coefficients,
five values have been defined as follows:
• complete stoppage: =1;
• strong impact = 0.95;
• some evident effects = 0.90;
• negligible effects = 0.85;
• no effects = 0.80.
Figure 5.3 reports a view of the developed electronic check list used during the
interviews.
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Figure 5.3.: Electronic check list used during the interviews to the experts.
With regards to the validation phase, this was carried out by considering both the
experts’ and the opinions’ reliability. The results are shown in figure 5.4 and 5.5
respectively. All the experts are within the 0.05 confidence range and only three
opinions of 256 are out of the range 0.05.
Figure 5.4.: Experts’ evaluation t-test.
The opinions showing a statistical difference belong to the following scenarios:
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• the diagnostic area impacting the crisis unit (0.053);
• the crisis unit area impacting the internal viability (0.053);
• the fire system impacting the hospital accessibility(0.051).
In spite of exceeding of statistical threshold, all the values were accepted in the
Leontief matrix coefficients ‘A’ as valid values since the approximated two decimal
values coincide with the limit value.
Figure 5.5.: Opinions’ statistical evaluation test.
Finally the highest dependency index ‘δ’ belongs to the surgical area with a value
of 2.05 while the highest gain index ‘ρ’ belongs to the power system with a value of
2.729. In figure 5.6 the output vector concerning the inoperability level of each hos-
pital area is reported, obtained as combination between the implemented Leontief
matrix and the seismic intensity I=6 perturbation introduced by the input inoper-
ability vector evaluated with the rapid vulnerability assessment forms.
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Figure 5.6.: Hospital area degradation according to a seismic intensity I=6.
Big differences exist amongst hospital areas: Emergency department, Diagnostic,
Operating theatre, ICU and Impatient awards are the most affected areas during
earthquakes. Plumbing system is the least affected area. With regards to the de-
velopment of the FTA model for OSMA hospital, figure 5.7, 5.8 and 5.9 report the
graphic models for the surgery, ICU and hospital beds area respectively.
Figure 5.7.: Surgery area at the OSMA hospital described by the FTA model ac-
cording to a seismic intensity I=6.
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Figure 5.8.: ICU area at the OSMA hospital described by the FTA model accord-
ing to a seismic intensity I=6.
Figure 5.9.: Hospital beds at the OSMA hospital described by the FTA model
according to a seismic intensity I=6.
The top event operability according to the specific medical area is as follows: 41.8%
for the operating theatre, 62.4% for the ICU and 72.8% for the hospital beds area.
Moreover, the hospital beds area is the only destination of use which depends on
both the building 1A and 1C and according to the non-structural elements, only the
fire system, the internal viability and the architectural components are taken into
consideration. The surgical room fault tree differs from the ICU tree for two main
elements, the presence of the water system (essential only in the surgery room) and
the medical equipment contribution which consists of the emergency medical care
in the operating theatre and the life support ones in the ICU area.
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5.3. Performance Assessment
According to the seismic intensity scenario I=6, figure 5.10 reports the performance
degradations of the hospital system according to the specific medical area and to
the type of model applied: the Leontief and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA).
Figure 5.10.: Performance degradation according to both medical area and model
type at OSMA hospital (I=6).
Figure 5.11a and 5.11b show respectively the estimated “HTC” and “IS” indices
resulting from the application of Leontief and FTA models. Moreover, two differ-
ent temporal scenarios are evaluated in the analysis: the day and night/holidays
scenarios.
The HTC degradation between day and night is very different for both models (one
order of difference). By analyzing the different response according to the type of
used model, the HTC degradation estimated by FTA is higher than the one assessed
by Leontief (58% to 45% during the day and 96% to 94% in the night time), while
the IS index estimated by Leontief is higher than the FTA one (30% to 25%). For
both models, no significant differences are assessed for the IS values according to
the day or time scenarios.
In order to better analyze and understand the differences resulting from the appli-
cation of the two models, in the next paragraph a sensitivity analysis on both the
specific medical areas and the hospital performance indicators is carried out and
takes into consideration the seismic intensity range I=4-10.
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Figure 5.11.: Hospital performance indices degradation according to medical area
and model type (I=6).
5.3.1. Sensitivity Analysis on System and Performance
Degradation
Hospital area
From the Leontief model application it is possible to analyze the seismic impact
on the single medical or technical area within the OSMA hospital in the seismic
intensity range I=4-10.
As reported in figure 5.12, it is possible to individuate three different groups of areas.
The first one consists of those areas which remain below the 50% inoperability at any
seismic intensity such as internal connection, gas network, fire system and hydric
network, the second group is composed by those medical areas staying between
50% and 100% degradation at the high seismic intensities (I=8-10) such as the
power system, the in-patient ward and the medical areas which provide special cares.
Finally the third group formed by the most vulnerable areas (100% degradation at
the high intensities I=8-10) which includes the emergency department, the surgery,
imaging and ICU areas.
The seismic behavior show high differences to the high intensities while for the low
intensities the hospital areas’ degradation is almost similar. The emergency dept.,
diagnostic, operating theatre, ICU are the most affected areas in hospital during
earthquakes. The results of FTA application, the results are reported in figure 5.13
where the levels of degradation are shown for surgery, ICU and hospital beds.
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Figure 5.12.: Seismic sensitivity analysis by considering the level of degradation
of each medical area at the OSMA.
Figure 5.13.: Medical areas degradation assessed by the FTA model application
to OSMA Hospital (Italy).
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The seismic behavior is characterized by three main areas according to the system
degradation. Frist the null-degradation zone for I=0-4, the second one involves the
medium-high intensities I=5-7 and shows degradation between 30-60%, (increasing
from the hospital beds, to the ICU and to OT respectively). The third area includes
the high seismic intensities I=8-10 and yields hospital area degradations between
70%-100%.
Moreover, I=5 and I= 8 represent the breaking points of the previous areas. Big
differences exist between surgery, ICU and hospital beds areas: surgery is the most
affected area (60% degradation already at I=5 and almost 100% at I=8), ICU passes
the 50% degradation only at I >7 with a maximum degradation level estimated
around 80% and finally the hospital beds area which is below 60% for I=6 and with
a 70% degradation as maximum level for I=10.
In figure 5.14 is reported the comparison between Leontief and FTA models. The
FTA model shows a stronger stability than the Leontief one especially for the high
seismic intensities (I>7). For lower intensities (I<7) both models have similar trends,
with the following differences: surgery area degradation is stronger for FTA model
than Leontief while ICU and bed hospitals (BH) show lower degradation with FTA
than Leontief.
Figure 5.14.: FTA-LEONTIEF model comparison at OSMA Hospital.
Hospital performance
With regards to the OSMA case study, figure 5.15a shows the HTC index estimated
by FTA for the different seismic intensities. The blue line shows the HTC trend
during the daytime while the red line is for the HTC during the night time and
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holidays. Big differences exist between the night and day time. For instance, con-
sidering a seismic intensity of I=4, the night HTC is 0.23 and presents a value ten
times lower than the day one which is 2.3. Night time and holidays HTC has a
linear trend with the seismic intensity I=8 as critical breaking point to which corre-
sponds an almost null HTC. Even if the trend for the day time HTC is steeper, I=8
represents the critical breaking point also for the daytime with a HTC estimation of
0.25 which corresponds to a 94.8% degradation from the pre-event status. For I>=8
both indexes (day and night/holidays scenarios) present close values. Figure 5.15b
reports the HTC analysis for the different seismic levels carried out with Leontief.
The blue line shows the HTC trend during day while the red line belongs to HTC
during night time and holidays. Also the FTA model gives big differences between
the night and day time HTC for intensity values I<8. While for I>8 the Leontief
system is not stable anymore. For FTA, night time and holidays HTC has a more
constant trend while for the day time HTC the trend decreases steeply.
Figure 5.15.: OSMA hospital (Italy) HTC estimation with: (a)FTA model and
(b)Leontief model.
Finally, figure 5.16 reports the comparisons between HTC trends evaluated by Leon-
tief and FTA models in the same graph. The night time and holidays HTC trend
has similar behavior in both models until the seismic intensity I=7. For the day
time HTC trend, even if the FTA model estimates lower values than Leontief, both
models show similar trends for the seismic range I=4-7. Over 7, Leontief is not
stable any more while FTA decreases slowly to the value “zero”.
According to the index (IS) at the different seismic intensities, figure 5.17a reports
the analysis estimated by the FTA model. The blue line shows the HTC trend during
day while the red line belongs to HTC during night time and holidays scenario. No
appreciable differences exist between the night/holidays and the day time scenarios.
Both trends have a steep linear trend with two main breaking points: the first one
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at the seismic level I=5 with a IS degradation of 50% (in relation to the pre-event
IS=1) and the second one at I=8 with a 70% degradation. Figure 5.17b reports the
IS analysis carried out with the Leontief model. Blue line shows the HTC trend
during day while red line belongs to HTC during night time and holidays scenarios.
Similare to the FTA analysis, no appreciable differences are evaluated between the
night and day trends. The analysis with Leontief model is only valid for intensities
lower than I=8 because for higher values the system is not stable anymore.
Figure 5.16.: FTA and Leontief HTCs comparison at the OSMA hospital.
Figure 5.17.: OSMA hospital (Italy) HTC estimation with: (a)FTA model and
(b)Leontief model.
As described for the HTC comparison, figure 5.18 shows in one graph the IS trends
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evaluated with Leontief and FTA models. As already described above, both models
produce similar outcomes in the seismic range (I=1-7) while for I=8, the Leontief
results are not reliable because of the system instability.
Figure 5.18.: FTA and Leontief IS indices comparison at the OSMA hospital.
5.4. Response Assessment
Florence is the main city in Tuscany and it is surrounded by a seismic country area.
In order to build a reliable scenario for this case study, the 1919 Mugello earthquake
has been considered in terms of geological and seismic features. In addition a field
work has been carried out to adapt the past seismic event to the current scenario
[96]. The last major seismic disaster in Tuscany was the earthquake of 29 June 1919,
whose epicentre was close to the town of Vicchio in the Mugello (the mountains
about 30 km north of Florence). The estimated intensity was 6.2 and the intensity
reached level X on the Mercalli scale used at the time. It was the worst earthquake
in Mugello area since 1542 [97].
These data have been processed by SIGE, a numerical simulation software developed
by the Italian Civil Protection Department. The software applies the past seismic
conditions to the actual situation such as the age of buildings, type of structures and
current resident population [98]. Following are the data obtained by the numerical
simulation: 390 red and yellow triaged patients (T1+T2), 1950 green triaged patients
and 260 deaths. Hence, by applying equation (14) the Florence HTD is 130 patients
which represent the total medical demand in Florence due to the seismic event (I=6).
By considering the equation (15) in chapter 3, every single hospital of the five
composing the health system in Florence should face with a HTDHOSPITAL equal to
2.6 patients/h in the acute response within the first ten hours. Indeed, with regards
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to the HTCI evaluation, the seismic intensity I=6 permits to calculate the values as
reported in table 5.3 according to both night and day time scenarios.
Table 5.3.: HTC and HTCI values determined for the OSMA hospital at a seismic
intensity I=6.
Given the fact that for a seismic intensity I=6 the Leontief model is still in the
stable range, outputs from both FTA and Leontief models are considered. Table 5.3
shows how the day time HTCI evaluated by FTA model is a bit lower than the one
estimated by Leontief. Both values present a day HTCI of around 0.5. As reported
in figure 5.19, the estimated HTCI value means that only half of the whole medical
demand can be satisfied in aftermath of a I=6 earthquake during the day time. For
the night time scenario, no appreciable differences exist between the models and
according to the calculated HTCI it would be able to satisfy only 5% of the whole
medical treatment demand. A HTCI=1 would be the target value representing the
scenario where the whole hospital demand from the local population is satisfied by
the hospital treatment capacity.
Figure 5.19.: HTCI evaluation at the OSMA hospital for seismic intensity I=6.
The green bar reports the full operational HTCI value with the hospital 100% func-
tional (pre-event) which is HTCI=1.15. This means that with a full operational
85
Chapter 5 Risk Assessment - Italian Case Study (OSMA)
non-degraded hospital, the medical demand in aftermath of a seismic event (I=6)
could be easily complied. 58% and 45% degradations of the pre-event value of the
hospital treatment capacity index (HTCI) are assessed by applying the FTA and
Leontief models respectively at the day time scenario while for the night scenario a
95% degradation is common for both models.
Moreover equations 18 and 19 would allow to estimate the minimum degradation
allowed, in case of I=6 seismic event, to offer an appropriate medical response to
the local health demand.
HTCFULL−OPERATIONAL −HTDHOSPITAL = HTCEXTRA (18)
Once obtained the extra HTC, which represents the maximum loss of performance
allowed during the seismic event, it is possible to obtain the corresponding HTC
degradation by applying the linear proportion reported in equation 19.
HTCFULL−OPERATIONAL : 100% = HTCEXTRA : X (19)
For the Florence hospital case study the value obtained is X=13%. By comparing
the allowed degradation with the estimated one, Florence hospital should carry out
mitigation strategies able to solve degradation problems for a range between 30% –
45%.
In conclusion, even if there are no significant differences between the two models
at the night scenario, the FTA model shows a more “pessimistic” behavior than
Leontief for the Hospital treatment capacity at the day scenario.
The Intrinsic Security at the Florence Hospital in case of I=6 seismic event has been
already reported in figure 5.11b and showed how FTA model shows a higher IS value
(0.7) than Leontief model (0.65) which correspond to a IS degradation of 30% and
34% respectively. This means a more optimistic behavior for Leontief model than
FTA for both scenarios night and day.
Last step of the hospital response evaluation to the seismic event with intensity I=6
regards the estimation of the Hospital Performance Index (HPI). According to the
equation 17 in chapter 3 and to the case of “city hospital” for the definition of the
coefficients η and θ (η=3, θ=2), the calculated HPI is reported in figure 5.20.
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Figure 5.20.: HPI evaluation at the OSMA hospital for seismic intensity I=6.
The HPI=1.09 typical for the fully functional hospital is reduced during an I=6
earthquake, according to the FTA model, by 48% and 71% for the day and night
scenarios respectively while Leontief assesses a degradation of 41% and 72% for day
and night scenarios respectively.
In conclusion, HPI for both FTA and Leontief models show similar behavior es-
pecially comparing the different values for night and day scenarios. A lower HPI
during the day scenario is assessed by FTA and a lower HPI for the night scenario
is estimated by Leontief.
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6. Methodology Validation
6.1. Overview
In order to validate the methodology, both models are applied to the main hospital
in L’Aquila in order to compare the outputs with the real ones observed during
the L’Aquila earthquake in 2009. The model validation aims to modify and update
the inoperability levels [37] in Leontief model (failure vector) and in FTA (basic
events) besides the constants η and θ defined in equation 17 in chapter 3. General
suggestions on both FTA and Leontief are expected as well.
6.2. San Salvatore Hospital and L’Aquila Earthquake
(2009)
The method described in the previous chapters has been validated through its appli-
cation to the real scenario of L’Aquila earthquake, 2009. On 6 April 2009 a seismic
event of intensity 6.3 struck the province of L’Aquila. It caused damage to 100.000
buildings in 57 municipalities, left 67,500 local residents homeless, killed 308 people
and injured 1.500, 202 of them seriously [99].
Figure 6.1 shows the San Salvatore Hospital, which is composed by 12 buildings.
It is the only hospital in L’Aquila and provides 464 hospital beds and 10 operating
rooms.
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Figure 6.1.: San Salvatore Hospital in L’Aquila.
By the interviews carried out with the San Salvatore hospital medical direction, it
has been possible to assess the functional levels at pre- and post- the seismic event
according to the specific medical areas: hospital beds, ICU and OT. The results are
reported in table 6.1.
Table 6.1.: San Salvatore hospital real performance in the aftermath of the 2009
earthquake.
According to the interviews, the medical equipment and the DATA system were
the most damaged systems. Moreover, the structural damages caused the loss of
the medical gas system (valve rupture) and the TAC rupture (linear accelerator
decalibration) due to the strong vibrations during the earthquake.
These damages caused a functionality loss of 80% for the surgical activity and 2%
for the hospital beds. No functional losses were estimated for the ICU area.
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6.3. Seismic Vulnerability Assessment
Rapid Vulnerability Evaluation
Table 6.2 and table 6.3 show the results obtained by the application of the rapid
vulnerability assessment forms described in chapter 2 and personally filled at the
hospital area.
Table 6.2.: Rapid assessment of structural and non-structural vulnerabilities at the
San Salvatore Hospital.
As reported in table 6.2, any specific differences according to the structural and
non-structural vulnerabilities are assessed amongst the different buildings while for
the functional aspects one building includes all the surgical activity of the hospital
as well as for ICU beds. Hospital beds are mainly distributed in two buildings which
contain almost the 60% of the whole hospital capacity (300/464 hospital beds), see
table 6.3.
Table 6.3.: Rapid assessment of administrative/organizational vulnerability and
beds capacity at the San Salvatore.
Leontief model
The input failures’ vector obtained by the evaluation forms according to a seismic
intensity (I=6) is reported in the table below.
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hospital area Inoperability level
A - Emergency department 0.03
B – Diagnostic 0.03
C - Surgical operation 0.03
D – ICU 0.03
E - Inpatient ward (hospital beds area) 0.03
F – Morgue 0.03
G - Lab 0.1
H - Crisis room 0.03
I - Internal connection (Lifts, viability, etc..) 0.03
L- Power network 0.1
M - Gas Network 0.1
N - Hydric Network 0.1
O – Back-up generator 0.1
P - Fire System 0.03
Q – Equipment 0.1
Table 6.4.: Input failures’ vector evaluated for the L’Aquila hospital (seismic in-
tensity I=6).
The inoperability outputs of the specific medical areas obtained as the combination
between the Leontief matrix and the input vector are showed in figure 6.2.
Figure 6.2.: Inoperability outputs per medical area at the San Salvatore hospital.
FTA model
The FTAmodel application has started with the tree designing process in accordance
to each medical area: hospital beds, ICU and OT. Figure 6.3 reports the hospital
beds tree while the ICU and the operating theatres can use the same trees developed
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within the OSMA case study since the one-building configuration is still valid for
the San Salvatore hospital as well.
Figure 6.3.: FTA applied to the hospital beds area at the San Salvatore hospital.
It is important to remind how, in the San Salvatore and OSMA hospitals appli-
cations, the same configuration of a fault tree does not absolutely mean the same
top event operability since the operability value depends also on the basic events
operability.
6.4. Performance Validation
With regards to the Leontief model, the evaluation estimated an index HTC=2.8
for the daytime and HTC=0.28 for the night time/holiday scenario. The IS index
assumed the value IS= 0.689 and IS= 0.690 for the day and night time/holidays
scenario respectively. The HTCs obtained by the FTA application are HTC=2.09
for the day scenario and HTC= 0.21 for the night and holidays.
While the real data (table 6.1) and the equation 11 in chapter 2 define a real post-
earthquake HTC=1 with a degradation from the initial value (HTC=5.0 - fully
operational) of 80%. Equation 12 estimates as real San Salvatore Intrinsic Security
IS=0.979 which consist of a 0.03% degradation from the beginning value.
As reported in figure 6.4, the difference between the HTC estimated by the models
and the real case is really high but the FTA model is closer to the real situation
than the Leontief one. The deviation between the models and the real case is 109%
for the FTA and 180% for Leontief. This means that FTA model is 39% more
accurate than the Leontief. With the term real case (REAL) is intended the post
event situation of the L’Aquila earthquake on April 6, 2009.
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Figure 6.4.: HTC according to the “real case” and to the FTA and Leontief models
at the L’Aquila hospital.
Although the L’Aquila earthquake struck at 3.32 am local time, for both the IS and
the HTC indices the validation process only considered for the real case comparison
the day scenario. This is due to the fact that even if the medical personnel available
couldn’t get the medical facility, many medical professionals spontaneously came
to the hospital reaching the ordinary number of medical professionals in service.
Moreover, no significant differences exist between the estimated IS day and IS night
for both models.
Figure 6.5 shows the estimated IS compared to the real case one.
Figure 6.5.: IS according to the “real case” and to the FTA and Leontief models
at the L’Aquila hospital.
The FTA model is closer to the real situation than Leontief by showing a relative
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dispersion to the real case of only 4%. For the Leontief model the deviation is 30%
(86% less accurate than the FTA analysis).
6.5. Response Validation
With regards to the medical demand during the L’Aquila earthquake, the number
of casualties caused by the event according to the triage code is reported in table
6.5.
Table 6.5.: Casualties distribution at the L’Aquila earthquake on April 6 2009.
By applying equation 14 the calculated HTD is equal to 6.7, while applying equation
15 and setting the San Salvatore facility as the only hospital in L’Aquila, the result-
ing HTDHOSPITAL(6.7) coincides with the HTD. The subsequent real case HTCI is
equal to 0.15.
The HTCI obtained by Leontief application is 0.41 according to the day scenario and
0.04 according to the night/holidays scenario. Moreover, the HPI is equal to 0.17
for daytime exposure and 0.3 for the night/holiday scenario. The HTCI resulting
from the FTA application is 0.31 and 0.03 for the day and night/holiday scenarios
respectively and the HPI are equal to 0.12 and 0.39 for the different scenarios, day
and night/holiday respectively.
Figure 6.6 shows the HTCI comparisons amongst the real situation HTCI (green
bar) with respect to the FTA and Leontief (LEO) estimations.
As described previously for the hospital performance validation, although the real
case study includes both night and day scenarios, only comparison with the day sce-
nario is carried out because, according to the personnel interviews, any appreciable
deviation from available staff and hospital personnel were noticed in aftermath of
the earthquake. All the available physicians and nurses living closely to the hospital
spontaneously decided to reach it for the emergency cares.
The expected lower presence of staff within the structure depends on organizational
and decision which make the most of medical personnel only available on call. Even
if it is a rational choice, the availability on call is a really vulnerable element in case
of earthquake, since it depends on road viability conditions.
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Figure 6.6.: HTCI validation according to the “real case” and to the FTA and
Leontief models at the L’Aquila hospital.
Hence comparing the Full Operational mode (FO), which defines the same pre event
HTCI for both models and the reality for the day scenario, FTA model provides a
more reliable and accurate outcome than Leontief. Precisely, FTA is 30% more
accurate than Leontief by showing a HTCI dispersion of 342% for the FTA model
and 495% for Leontief.
The last step of the validation process includes the HPI estimation with respect to
the real HPI. As figure 6.7 reports, the results are contradictory with respect to
the specific indices ‘validation as reported in figure 6.5 and 6.6 for IS and HTCI
respectively.
Figure 6.7.: HPI validation according to the “real case” and to the FTA and Leon-
tief models at the L’Aquila hospital.
In fact, although the HPI is a linear combination of HTCI and IS, the HPI com-
parison shows how the Leontief model is closer to the real situation than the one
96
6.6 Validation Outcomes
estimated with FTA, with a relative deviation from the real case of 22%, which is
lower than the dispersion obtained with the FTA (28%).
In conclusion the validation showed high models’ dispersion compared to the real
case. Changes are necessary to the failure input vector coefficients used for the Leon-
tief matrix and for the reliability coefficients in FTA (0.3 for High vulnerability, 0.1
for medium level and 0.03 for low one). Moreover given the contradiction behavior
of the HPI index, η and θ coefficients must be included in the modification process
as well.
6.6. Validation Outcomes
A sensitivity analysis has been carried out for choosing the right coefficients and
minimizing the differences between the real case and the models. The new values
are as follows 0.3 for High vulnerability, 0.18 for Medium level and 0.005 for the
Low one. As reported in figure 6.8a, the HTCI post-validation dispersion passed to
0% and 40% for FTA and Leontief models respectively.
Figure 6.8.: L’Aquila hospital HTCI PRE and POST validation.
With regards to the index IS, the deviation with new coefficients was reduced to 3.6%
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and 43% respectively for FTA and Leontief, see figure 6.8b. In general, with the post
validation new coefficients the mean deviation from the real case was reduced to 1.8%
(173% pre-validation) for the FTA model with a general improvement in accuracy of
almost 100% while with regards to the Leontief model, the post validation deviation
is 42% (262% pre validation) with a general improvement of 83%.
Finally, according the HPI index, η and θ coefficients have been modified according
to the following consideration. Since HTCI is an index with an approximate range
of 0-10 while IS only can get values between 0-1, the same difference must be kept
for the coefficients as well. Hence, in order to maintain the same proportion, the η
parameter should be on order bigger than θ.
The updated values are as follows:
• City Hospital η = 20, θ= 1;
• Country Hospital η = 10, θ= 3;
• Small City Hospitalη = 20, θ= 3.
Figure 6.9 reports the situation pre- and post- validation according to the HPI eval-
uated with the new coefficients. The FTA model is now closer to the real situation
than Leontief confirming the expected situation due to the HTCI and IS specific
analysis. The real case HPI is 0.13 with a FTA value of 0.12 and the Leontief
HPI=0.17.
Figure 6.9.: L’Aquila hospital HPI PRE and POST validation.
In conclusion, the new indices for the hospital response assessment have been up-
dated with the post validation coefficients and used for a new application to the
OSMA hospital.
Regarding the HTC analysis, only the daytime scenario is considered since the night
scenario trend is constantly ten times lower than the day one. With regards to the
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Intrinsic Security, only the day scenario is reported in the graphs below since the
night time trend is similar to the day one.
Figure 6.10.: OSMA hospital PRE and POST validation: (a)HTC and (b)IS.
Figure 6.10a shows the new HTC. With respect to the pre-validation, the post-
validation trend shows more stability at low seismic intensities (I<4) but the strong
degradation of the hospital treatment capacity (HTC) is anticipated at the value
I=5. For I>8 both pre- and post-validation indices are similar. Lower levels of HTC
are estimated with the post validation coefficients at the medium-high intensities
(I=5-7) while a “more optimistic trend” is evaluated for the lowest intensities (I<4).
Moreover, the decrease assessed for I=7 depends on the structural contribution to the
seismic damages estimation (medium vulnerability) while the step down at intensity
I=8 represents the negative contribution of viability and basic installation elements
to the hospital vulnerability assessment.
Figure 6.10b shows the IS sensitivity analysis for OSMA hospital in Florence by
comparing the pre- and post-validation trends. Although the differences between
the pre- and post-validation trends are smaller than the one regarding the HTC, the
IS post-validation trend is higher for the lowest seismic levels (I<5) while is lower
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for the medium and highest ones (I>5). As well as for the HTC trend, IS shows a
small decrease at intensity I=7 which depends on the involvement of the structural
elements in vulnerability assessment while the decrease at intensity I=8 is given by
the contribution of the viability and basic installations’ elements to the vulnerability
estimation.
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Study(SCVMC)
7.1. Overview
As the aim of this dissertation is to apply a broad-based model to a modern general
hospital, and in order to cover the widest range of health structures, the validated
methodology has been applied to a US hospital in California. The Santa Clara
Valley Medical Center (SCVMC) is one of the four main hospitals situated in San
Jose, California – US. The SCVMC is a 600 hospital beds public facility with 12
surgery tables and equipped for air rescue. As reported in figure 7.1, the medical
areas are distributed into three main buildings: building “A” which is a modern
construction containing administration and pharmacy, building “B” containing 12
surgery rooms, in-patients and 40 ICU beds, and finally building “C” which is the
oldest one and contains the emergency department, the helicopter airstrip and a
part of the in-patients ward (hospital beds area). Other buildings, which are not
showed in figure 7.1, contain basic installation components and support areas such
as the laundry or the hospital kitchen.
Figure 7.1.: The Santa Clara Valley Medical Center (SCVMC) in San Josè – CA,
US [source: Googlemap].
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The San Jose area is within the Santa Clara County and is considered highly seismic
as well as for the whole California state. San Josè is situated on a type “C” soil, see
figure 7.2[100].
Figure 7.2.: The Santa Clara County soil classification[100].
7.2. Seismic Vulnerability Assessment
Rapid Vulnerability Evaluation
The rapid vulnerability assessment results are described below. Table 7.1 reports
the number of hospital and ICU beds and operating tables besides the different
vulnerability types and levels assessed for each building by taking into account a
seismic intensity I=6. The rapid assessment procedure has been carried out with
the support of the facility manager and the chief of construction services at the
SCVMC.
Table 7.1.: Vulnerability levels assessed with the rapid assessment procedure at the
SCVMC.
All buildings show a low structural vulnerability, especially building ‘B’ and ‘C’
which belong to steel moment resistant constructions. Fire risk is really low because
no flammable gas is present within the hospital and the level of detection, protection
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and evacuation measures is high everywhere in the facility. Architectural and basic
installation components show a medium vulnerability level because of the presence
of covering glasses and external conditioners, especially for building ‘C’, see figure
7.3a and 7.3b respectively. For the installations, a weak point is represented by the
lack of appropriate, robust and healthy (non-rusty) anchorage systems, see figure
7.3c for the medical gas tank. Finally, medical equipment is generally fixed to the
floor and all the essential medical areas in case of seismic event are present within
the SCVMC (figure 7.3d).
Figure 7.3.: Non-structural vulnerability assessment: (a)Architectural elements
and basic installations, (b)inappropriate anchorage, (d)appropriate anchorage.
Moreover, the field assessment showed that some systems’ connections are not flex-
ible such as the pipes containing oil supply to back-up generator, see figure 7.4.
Figure 7.4.: Non-structural vulnerability: rigid pipes for back-up generator oil
supply.
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Pipes rigidity can cause ruptures which can be subsequently responsible for back-up
generator malfunctioning and high risk of fire.
Leontief model
The Leontief model has been applied in order to carry out comparisons between
the Italian and US case studies for what concerns hospital organization, system
degradation at the intensity I=6 and experts interview. Regarding the hospital
performance and response evaluation, only FTA model is taken into consideration
since it represents the most accurate and reliable model as showed in the previous
sensitivity analysis (chapter 6). Two experts were interviewed for the definition of
the matrix coefficients and included:
• 1 technical director of facilities;
• 1 emergency department chairman.
The questionnaire consisted of 196 semi-structured questions and considered both
expertise and confidence levels. Crisis room was not inserted in the interviews as
it is not present in the SCVMC. The highest dependency index ‘δ’ belongs to the
surgical area with a value of 1.99 while the highest gain index ‘ρ’ belongs to the
power system with a value of 2.84. In figure 7.5 is reported the output inoperability
levels of each hospital area.
Figure 7.5.: SCVMC output inoperability levels for intensity I=6.
Big differences were estimated amongst the hospital areas: emergency dept., operat-
ing theatre, ICU and in-patient wards are the most affected areas while the medical
equipment and morgue are the least affected areas.
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FTA model
The new FTA model built for SCVMC is reported in figures 7.6, 7.7 and 7.8. The
estimated operability is 24.6% for surgical activity, 61.7% for ICU and 87% for the
ordinary hospital beds.
Figure 7.6.: Operating theatre fault tree design at the SCVMC.
Figure 7.7.: ICU fault tree design at the SCVMC.
Figure 7.8.: Hospital beds area fault tree design at the SCVMC.
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7.3. Performance Assessment
The performance evaluation has been carried out by estimating both indices HTC
and IS for the range intensities I=4-10 and it is reported in the next paragraph
concerning the sensitivity analysis at the SCVMC.
7.4. Seismic Sensitivity Analysis
7.4.1. System Degradation
With the application of the Leontief model according to the seismic intensities, it
is possible to define two different groups of medical areas at the SCVMC: the first
one including all those areas remaining below 100% inoperability at any seismic
intensities I=1-10 and the second one including all those medical areas getting the
100% degradation/inoperability, see figure 7.9.
Figure 7.9.: LEONTIEF model results for SCVMC (US) application.
While for low intensities the seismic response follows a more constant trend for all the
areas, at the high magnitudes, the differences in seismic behavior are highlighted.
Moreover, emergency dept., operating theatre, ICU and impatient ward are the
most affected areas while all the basic installations areas and the medical equipment
never pass over the 50% inoperability level. Laboratory is over the 50% level only
for I=10. Emergency department, surgery, ICU and in-patients areas are the only
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ones showing a 100% inoperability level. The results of the FTA application are
reported in figure 7.10. Three different seismic areas are detectable from the graph
according to the seismic intensities: the first area includes I= 1-4, second area involve
intensities between 5 and 7 and the third area takes into consideration intensities
I=8-10. Seismic magnitude I=5 is an important level for the surgery performance
degradation while I=8 represents a crucial point for ICU security. Finally, intensity
I=9 represents the critical point for the hospital beds areas.
Figure 7.10.: FTA model application to SCVMC (US).
Summarizing the FTA estimation, surgery is the most affected area with over 70%
degradation already at the seismic intensities I=5-7 and almost 100% at I=9. For
intensity I=8 ICU is over the 50% degradation and the maximum loss is assessed
for intensity I=10. Finally, hospital beds area is always below the 50% limit except
for the intensity I=10 where the degradation reaches the 50%.
7.4.2. Performance Degradation
Regarding the US case study, figure 7.11 reports the HTC analysis carried out with
the FTA model according to the different seismic magnitudes. Blue line shows the
HTC during the day time while red line defines the HTC during night/holidays
scenario. Big differences exist between the night and day time HTC. For instance,
considering a seismic intensity I=4, the night HTC=0.6 presents a value ten times
lower than the day one with HTC=5.71. The same situation is valid for each seismic
intensity (I=4-10). Night/holidays HTC is almost constant within the seismic range
(I=5-10) while for the day scenario the main braking points are for I= 5 (HTC=
1.48) and I=8 where the assessed HTC loses 89% of the pre-event operability with
HTC= 0.67. Finally for higher intensities (I>8) the trend is almost constant.
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Figure 7.11.: HTC estimation (FTA model) at the SCVMC (US).
Regarding the Intrinsic Security (IS), the analysis reported in figure 7.12 in accor-
dance to the different seismic magnitudes has been carried out with the FTA model
application. The blue line shows the IS trend during the day time while the red line
defines the IS for night time and holidays scenario. No appreciable differences are
estimated between the night/holidays and day time. Both indices have an almost
linear trend with two main breaking points: the first one at the intensity I=5 cor-
responding to a 15% degradation from the pre-event value (IS=1) and the second
given by the intensity I=8 which provides with a 30% degradation. Finally the esti-
mated degradation for intensity I=9 corresponds to 40% degradation while for I=10
there is the maximum degradation (IS=0.5).
Figure 7.12.: IS estimation (FTA model) at the SCVMC (US).
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7.5. Response Assessment
The San Francisco I=8 1906 earthquake has been considered as scenario for the
casualty estimation at the Santa Clara County. A death toll of 103 was paid by the
county which consisted at that time of 50.000 inhabitants. The same number was
chosen for the current assessment because, although the strong increase of population
(almost 2.000.000 inhabitants currently) safer constructions have been built on a
geological ground safer than San Francisco.
For the estimation of severe casualties the following hypothesis has been made: use
the ‘Deaths Severe Ratio’ coefficient (DSR) used by the SIGE software of the Italian
Civil Protection Department [98] in the Florence case study (DSR=1.5). A total of
153 severe casualties have been taken into consideration for the case study.
Hence, by applying equation 14 the HTD assumes the value of 51 patients which
represents the total medical demand in Santa Clara County caused by a I=8 seismic
event.
Moreover, the use of equation 15 permits to evaluate the working load estimated for
each facility in the area. Since the SCVMC is one of the four composing the health
system in the Santa Clara County, the SCVMC should face with a HTDHOSPITAL
=1.28 patients per hour. Regarding the HTCI evaluation at the seismic intensity
I=8, the values for both night/holidays and day scenarios are 0.05 and 0.52 respec-
tively.
As the seismic intensity I=8 does not permit to obtain reliable and stable data from
the Leontief model, only FTA model has been applied for the risk assessment and
treatment phase at SCVMC. As reported in figure 7.13, a HTCI =0.52 means that
only half of the whole assessed medical demand can be satisfied in aftermath of the
I=8 earthquake during the day time at the SCVMC. For the night time scenario, the
model estimates that only 5% of the medical demand can be satisfied. A HTCI=1
would be the minimum value (HTCITARGET) for an appropriate scenario where the
whole medical demand is completely coped by the hospital.
The green bars show the pre-event HTCI when the hospital is fully working and
100% functional (HTCIPRE-EVENT=4.69). This means that with a full operational
hospital, the medical demand in aftermath of a seismic event with intensity I=8
could be easily complied.
Equations 18 and 19 allow to estimate the maximum degradation allowed, in case of
a intensity I=8 seismic event at the SCVMC. Once obtained the HTCEXTRA, which
represents the maximum allowed loss during the seismic hospital degradation, it
is possible to obtain the corresponding HTC degradation by applying the linear
proportion in equation 19.
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Figure 7.13.: HTCI estimation at the SCVMC for a intensity I=8.
For the US hospital case study the obtained value is 72%. HTC=0.67 is the assessed
value for I=8 earthquake at the SCVMC and it represents the 90% degradation from
the pre-event value. This means that eventual direct mitigation strategies at the
SCVMC should be able to solve degradation problems for HTC about 20%.
The Intrinsic Security at the SCVMC in case of I=8 seismic event is reported in
figure 7.14. The FTA model does not show any difference between the night and
day scenarios for both models (IS=0.69).
Figure 7.14.: IS estimation at the SCVMC for a intensity I=8.
110
7.6 Comparison With the Italian Case Study
Last step for risk assessment methodology applied to the SCVMC case study is
the estimation of the Hospital Performance Index (HPI). According to the equation
17 and to the case of “city hospital” for the definition of the coefficients η and θ
(η=20, θ=1), the SCVMC HPI is reported in figure 7.15. From a HPI=3.21 typical
for the fully functional hospital, the degradation assessed by the FTA model is
83.45% (HPIDAY=0.53) and 97.35% (HPINIGHT=0.09) for the day and night/holidays
scenario respectively.
Figure 7.15.: HPI estimation at the SCVMC for a intensity I=8.
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7.6.1. Hospital Vulnerability
Rapid Vulnerability Estimation
According to the rapid vulnerability forms, the following comparisons can be sug-
gested between the OSMA hospital (with the post validation coefficients) and SCVMC.
By considering a common seismic intensity I=6 for both cases, the SCVMC shows
a better seismic behavior for medical equipment and hospital capability with a “low
“estimated level of vulnerability against a “medium” level for OSMA hospital. This
is mostly due to the lack of the equipment anchorage and the missing of the blood
bank area at the Florentine hospital. While for the seismic intensity I=8 both
cases have reveled a high vulnerability for basic installations and systems with the
SCVMC presenting lower structural, architectural and capability vulnerabilities.
Leontief Model
According to Leontief model outcomes the following comparisons between US and
Italy cases can be made:
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• By considering I=6 for both studies, the Italian hospital showed that all the
medical areas’ degradations remain within the 50% inoperability limit while
for the US case, all the areas’ degradations remain within the 60% threshold;
• By considering I=8 for both hospitals, the Italian case showed that the emer-
gency department, surgery, ICU and inpatients areas reach the 100% degra-
dation limit while for the US case, all the areas’ degradations remain within
the 85% value;
• By considering the sensitivity analysis carried out by taking into consideration
the seismic levels I=4-10, the plumbing system is more damaged in US than
in Italy (no water tanks’ back up are available in US);
• Medical equipment is the most affected technical area in Italy while in US is
the least hit (it is due to the anchorage policy carried out in US);
• The most affected areas are the Emergency department and the Surgery for
OSMA hospital and SCVMC respectively;
• Generally, for highest seismic intensities (I=8-10) US hospital shows a better
response.
FTA model
With regards to the FTA model application, figure 7.16 shows the comparison con-
cerning the following medical area degradations: surgical area, ICU and inpatients.
For all the seismic intensities, surgical activity, ICU and inpatients wards show lower
estimated performance degradations at the SCVMC. For the surgical area, similar
trends are obtained for both cases even if the US degradation is always 5-10% lower
than the Italian one. The same behavior involves the ICU trends. The biggest dif-
ference stands for the inpatients ward which shows, for the US application, a much
lower degradation than the OSMA one. The difference increases more and more by
increasing the seismic intensities. Moreover, for the inpatients ward big differences
regarding the fire protection systems installed in SCVMC exists compared to the
OSMA hospital.
Finally, for all the medical areas the comparison shows a safer structural behavior
at the US SCVMC compared to the OSMA hospital especially by considering high
seismic intensities.
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Figure 7.16.: Medical areas’ degradation concerning the OSMA hospital and
SCVMC case studies.
7.6.2. Hospital Performance
By considering the hospital performance evaluation, following the performance in-
dices ‘HTC’ and ‘IS’ referred to OSMA and SCVMC hospitals are compared.
HTC evaluation is shown in figure 7.17.
Figure 7.17.: HTC degradation concerning the OSMA hospital and SCVMC case
studies.
The starting US pre event HTC (I<=3) is two times higher than the OSMA hospital
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with HTCSCVMC= 6 and HTCOSMA= 3 but the degradation trends are similar even if
the punctual values at each seismic magnitude are higher for the Florence hospital,
except for intensities I=4-6 where the HTC indices have similar degradation levels
(0-4%).
Moreover, by considering the highest seismic intensities, the difference in degradation
increases with a maximum deviation for I=7 which is equal to 8% higher, while for
I=8, I=9 and I=10 the differences are 6%, 4% and 3% respectively higher than
OSMA hospital.
The IS evaluation is showed in figure 7.18. The Italian hospital degradation is higher
for all the seismic magnitudes. The higher is the seismic intensities and the higher
is the difference between the IS values referred to the SCVMC and OSMA hospital.
Moreover, ISSCVMCshows a constant trend for the middle intensities (I=5-7) while
the ISOSMA constantly decreases. The maximum degradation is almost 80% for the
OSMA hospital and almost 50% for the SCVMC. This shows a behavior for the
ISSCVMC which is 40% better than ISOSMA.
Figure 7.18.: IS degradation concerning the OSMA hospital and SCVMC case
studies.
7.6.3. Hospital Response
First of all it is necessary to remind the medical demand scenario regarding both the
Italian and US case study. For the Italian scenario, the total hit population consid-
ered in the study is around 1.200.000 people with a HTDHOSPITAL=2.6 derived by
the presence of 5 main hospitals while for the US case study, the affected population
is around 1.800.000 people with a HTDHOSPITAL=1.3 derived by the availability of
4 main hospitals.
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Figure 7.19 shows the HTCI comparison between the two case studies. For both
scenarios day and night/holidays, SCVMC shows a higher hospital response than
the Italian one which is estimated on the double. Nevertheless, for both scenarios
the minimum HTCITARGET is missed and strong decreases are estimated for the
night/holidays scenario.
Figure 7.19.: HTCI estimation concerning the OSMA hospital and SCVMC case
studies.
With regards to the HPI evaluation, the SCVMC scenario provides a better response
than the OSMA hospital even if both are not able to cope with an appropriate health
response in case of seismic event, see figure 7.20.
Figure 7.20.: HPI estimation concerning the OSMA hospital and SCVMC case
studies.
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In the next chapter, both scenarios will be analyzed and treated for an accurate risk
mitigation process in order to define the most efficient and appropriate interventions
which could be able to provide the minimum level of hospital response (HPITARGET,
HTCITARGET and ISTARGET).
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SCVMC
8.1. Overview
In this chapter is reported the risk mitigation methodology of a modern hospital
through the US (SCVMC) and Italian (OSMA) case studies. Only the FTA model
has been used in the analysis as the most reliable and accurate model. The miti-
gation activities described in the next paragraphs aim reduce the estimated seismic
risk by applying different retrofitting measures and analyzing the subsequent secu-
rity, performance and economic impact on the hospital. This approach is essential
for identifying the most efficient strategies for reducing the seismic risk in health
structures.
8.2. OSMA Hospital
The risk mitigation regarding the Florence hospital takes into consideration the same
seismic scenario used for the risk assessment previously described which has included
both the hospital system and the specific hazard impact caused by a seismic intensity
I=6. As reported in the hospital vulnerability assessment in Florence (chapter 5),
the goal of the risk reduction procedure is reducing the “unfulfilled medical demand”
for HTC.
Figure 8.1 shows how only 23% of the medical needs are fully complied with a 77%
gap to the HTCTARGET (2.60 patients per hour).
Regarding the intrinsic security (IS), the aim of reducing the “unsecure area” cor-
responds to a gap of 30% of the whole inpatients area, see figure 8.2.
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Figure 8.1.: OSMA hospital response assessment (HTC).
Figure 8.2.: OSMA hospital response assessment (IS).
Following are reported the HTCOSMA simulations according to the different type of
interventions described in chapter 4.
8.2.1. Direct Actions
Hospital performance
Figure 8.3a shows the simulation resulting from the application of type 2 actions
with respect to the current ISOSMA and which include non-structural interventions
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to medical devices, office equipment and architectural elements. Appreciable im-
provements are evaluated for IS at the seismic intensity I=6 where, with respect to
the current situation, the simulated one leads to a reduction of 20% of the unsecure
area which corresponds to 10% improvement of the current situation. Regarding
type 3 actions, the ISOSMA improvement is higher than the previous one by showing
a 20% reduction of the current “unsecure areas”, see figure 8.3b.
Figure 8.3c shows the mitigation effects of applying type 4 actions. The night time
scenario reaches the performance level of the day time while no improvements are
appreciated with respect to the current situation for the day scenario.
Finally figure 8.3d shows the mitigation strategies effects on ISOSMA by simulating
a structural retrofitting for the hospital. Appreciable effects can be evaluated only
at the highest intensities I=7–10, while any differences have been assessed between
night and the day scenarios.
Figure 8.3.: Simulation of direct actions at OSMA hospital according to IS. Type
2(a), type 3(b), type 4(c) and type 5(d).
Figure 8.4 shows the simulation of the mitigation strategies on IS by applying the
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non-structural retrofitting by involving type 3 and type 2 actions. The type 4 has not
been included since it only effects on night/holidays scenario. For intensity I=6 the
simulation provides ISOSMA=ISTARGET which guarantees almost a 100% secure areas
(IS=0.99). Moreover, the simulated ISOSMA only starts decreasing at the highest
intensities (I=8-10) with a maximum degradation at intensity I=10 (ISOSMA= 0.5).
Figure 8.4.: Type 2 and 3 actions for risk reduction at the OSMA hospital
(ISOSMA).
A further simulation is represented by adding the contribution of the structural
retrofitting to the previous one (type 2 + type 3). Figure 8.5 compares this simu-
lation scenario (NS+S) with the type 2 plus type 3 measures (NS). Only the day
scenario is shown because no differences are evaluated in the night/holidays one.
At the intensity I=6 no differences are perceptible while for the highest intensities
(I=7-10) the (NS+S) simulation shows a higher ISOSMA (+10%) than the (NS) one.
Figure 8.5.: ISOSMA comparisons between (S+NS) and (NS).
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The risk mitigation procedure is now applied to the HTC in order to complete the
evaluation of the hospital performance. Figure 8.8 shows the simulation effects by
applying the direct interventions compared to the current situation for the day time.
The simulated scenarios include both day and night/holidays scenarios. Figure 8.6a
describes the outcomes resulting by the type 2 retrofitting simulation. Perceptible
improvements are assessed for the seismic range I=5-7 (+0.28) regarding the day
scenario. The night time scenario trend is following the day time trend but with ten
times lower values.
Figure 8.6b shows the simulation effects of type 3 actions. The HTCOSMA improve-
ment is about 218% higher than the current one with a day value of 1.94 for the
seismic intensity I=6. High improvements are also given for the seismic range I=
5-7, while for the highest intensities (I=8-10) the HTCOSMA is 164% higher than the
current value. The night scenario gives almost constant trend which is never higher
than HTCOSMA=0.4.
Figure 8.6.: Retrofitting simulations on HTC at the OSMA hospital. (a)type2,
(b)type 3, (c) type 5 and (d) comparison between (S+NS) and (NS) measures.
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Type 4 measures simulation only provides the same value for both the current and
simulated HTCOSMA.
Figure 8.6c reports the effects of type 5 retrofitting for both day and night/holidays
scenarios. Appreciable improvements are estimated for the day scenario at seismic
intensity I=7 (+22%) while for I=6 no differences are shown.
Finally, figure 8.6d shows the comparisons between the simulation effects of non-
structural actions ‘NS’ (type 2 + type 3) and the non-structural plus structural
interventions ‘S+NS’ (type 2 + type 3 + type 5). Only the day scenario is an-
alyzed. No appreciable differences or improvements are estimated for the seismic
intensities I=1-6, in the seismic range (I=5-7) both scenarios almost maintain the
initial value (HTC=2.85) which corresponds to a 367% improvement of the HTC
current condition. For the highest magnitudes, ‘NS+S’ actions show higher HTC
than NS scenario. For intensity I=7 the simulated HTCOSMA is 2.85 also for the
seismic level I=7 (+470% improvement) and for the highest intensities (I=8-10) the
general improvement of ‘NS+S’ and ‘NS’is 335% and 270% respectively.
Hospital response
The OSMA hospital response for a seismic intensity I=6 is reported in figure 8.7
which shows the current HTCI post-event degradation. The HTCI is strongly re-
duced from the initial pre-event value (HTCI=1.15) to the post-event one (HTCI=
0.23).
As already done for the ISOSMA, in the next paragraphs the effects of the retrofitting
simulations according to the type of actions on HTCIOSMA for the intensity I=6 are
reported.
Figure 8.7a shows the simulation effects of type 2 actions on OSMA hospital and
estimates a 48% improvement of the current HTCI for both day and night/holidays
scenario. Figure 8.7b shows the effects of type 3 actions. A 226% improvement of the
current HTCI has been assessed for both day and night scenario. The effects regard-
ing the type 4 actions focus just on the night scenario which reach the same HTCI
value of the current day scenario HTCI, passing from 0.02 to the simulated value
of 0.23. Regarding the type 5 retrofitting simulation, no significant improvements
have been assessed for the seismic level I=6 for both day and night scenario.
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Figure 8.7.: “Type 2 and type 3” actions for risk reduction at the OSMA hospital
(HTCIOSMA).
Figure 8.8 shows the comparison between the application of non-structural miti-
gation strategies (NS) and the application of non-structural actions plus structural
interventions (NS+S) without taking into consideration the type 4 measures. For the
OSMA hospital, structural retrofitting is not necessary to comply with the medical
demand caused by a a seismic event with intensity I=6.
Figure 8.8.: HTCIOSMA comparisons between (S+NS) and (NS) retrofitting.
Figure 8.9 shows the current HPI at the Florence hospital at I=6 seismic intensity
for both day and night/holidays scenario. The aim of the retrofitting strategies is
reducing the gap between the current estimated HPI (0.75 and 0.95 for day and night
scenarios respectively) and the HPITARGET. Moreover, the maximum acceptable loss
(HPI=0.15) is provided by the difference between the pre-event HPIOSMA (1.15) and
HPITARGET 0.15.
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Figure 8.9a shows the effects resulting from the simulation of type 2 actions on the
current HPI. The simulated HPIOSMA improved with respect to the current one for
both day (44%) and night/holidays (40%) scenarios.
While figure 8.9b reports the effects of type 3 actions. The simulated values (HPI=0.75)
and (HPI=0.10) correspond to a 204% and a 120% improvement for day and night/holidays
scenarios respectively.
Figure 8.9.: “Type 2 and type 3 actions” for risk reduction at the OSMA hospital
(HPIOSMA).
No improvements are obtained for the day scenario according to the type 4 actions
while for the night/holidays HPI there is an improvement by 400%.
According to the structural retrofitting defined by type 5 actions, no improvements
with respect to the current HPI have been assessed for both day and night scenarios
at the intensity I=6.
Figure 8.10 reports the comparison between the simulations of non-structural (NS)
mitigation strategies and non-structural plus structural interventions (S+NS). Both
cases have been analyzed without taking into consideration the type 4 actions. For
the day scenario the HPITARGET is successfully reached by the application of both
strategies. Structural retrofitting is unnecessary for the OSMA seismic risk mitiga-
tion at seismic intensity I=6. The total improvement with respect to the current
HPI daytime index is around 336% with a final HPIOSMA=1.09.
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Figure 8.10.: HPIOSMA comparisons between (S+NS) and (NS) retrofitting.
8.2.2. Indirect Actions
Hospital response
The risk reduction at the OSMA hospital by the use of the indirect actions is
described as follows. In order to get HTCITARGET (HTCI=1), the indirect mea-
sures must guarantee an improvement of 0.77 for the HTCI which corresponds to
a HTC improvement of 2.00 patients/hour. This means a HTC value equal to the
HTDHOSPITAL=2.60. According to equation 11 in chapter 2, 4 extra surgery tables
(γ1 = 10) are necessary (option 1) in order to successfully cope with the medical
needs. This corresponds to an aerial medical evacuation of 2 patients per hour
(option 2), see figure 8.11.
Figure 8.11.: OSMA hospital risk reduction with the application of indirect actions
(HTCI).
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Regarding the intrinsic security, any indirect intervention can be used for improving
this parameter since the indirect actions belong to the coping phase of the medical
response and do not take into consideration the pre-event security level of medical
occupants.
Finally, the HPI improvement is reported in figure 8.12. Because of the impossibility
to operate on the intrinsic security through the indirect interventions, the post
mitigation HPI, obtained by the HTCI indicated in figure 8.11, provides a final
value 0.97.
Figure 8.12.: OSMA hospital risk reduction with the application of indirect actions
(HPI).
The economic impact of indirect actions is approximately null for the hospital deci-
sion makers (with respect to the direct interventions) because the interventions are
carried out by other civil and military institutions involved in the medical response
chain (chapter 1).
On the other hand, the indirect actions have some negative points, e.g. the trans-
portation of the mobile medical units can’t be carried out when the road viability is
damaged, which is possible after an earthquake for geological, structural and mass
sociologic reasons. Moreover, the mandatory presence of available and undamaged
airstrip for airplane and helicopters could make the use of aerial evacuations un-
available.
Finally, the application of indirect measures for mitigating the seismic risk contains
an efficiency related problem. Even if the HTCI can reach the appropriate level
HTCITARGET, the time necessary to activate a mobile medical unit or the aerial
evacuation, which must be quantified as 2 patients every hour, could have significant
delays estimated as around 10 hours for fields hospital installation to a couple of
hours for urgency medical unit (tents or shelters) [101].
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8.2.3. Cost Assessment
The cost of the interventions listed above has been estimated taking into account
each mitigation action with the subsequent cost as reported in chapter 4.3.1 and
4.3.2, and by considering the seismic scenario in which they have been contextu-
alized. The cost related to the direct interventions are reported in figure 8.13 and
8.14.
Figure 8.13.: Direct actions’ cost for ISOSMA and HTCIOSMA: (a)action type-
HTCI; (b)action type-IS; (c)Successfully actions-HTCITARGET;(d)Successfully
actions-ISTARGET.
• Type 2 and type 3 actions - the interventions pertain to both the technical
installations (with fixation techniques, anchorage of functional elements and
the inclusion of flexible connections between floors and buildings) and to the
medical equipment (anchorage). As OSMA has a total area of 4.838m2, di-
vided into three main buildings (Lotto 1: 1.800m2, Lotto 2: 2.688m2and Lotto
3: 350m2), the estimated total cost of the technical equipment retrofitting is
12.120€. With regards the cost analysis of the medical equipment anchor-
age, the following procedure has been applied: first, an extraction from the
hospital medical equipment database has been asked to clinical engineering
department, secondly, the equipment with high-priority of anchorage has been
defined according to chapter 4.1 (283 technologies on the whole technology
dotation 783 needs anchorage) and as last step the equipment requiring an-
chorage has been evaluated (182 fixed on 283 with high anchorage priority).
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The estimated cost for fixing the remaining 101 devices is 18.200€. Consid-
ering both type 2 and type 3 cost, the total assessment for OSMA hospital is
around 30.000€.
• Type 4 actions: - in order to simplify the estimation of this intervention, it
was taken into consideration the case of the medical personnel essential for
working in 1 surgery room which can be approximated to the staff costs: 1
surgeon and 1 anesthetist. The total cost for this scenario is about 180.000€.
• Type 5 actions - as reported in 4.3.1 and 4.3.2, the structural actions are
estimated in an expected cost of 200 €/m2. As the whole surface of OSMA
hospital is 4.838 square meters, the subsequent cost can be approximated to
1.000.000€ (4.838m2 * 200€/m2= 967.000€).
Figure 8.14.: Direct intervention cost related to HPIOSMA according to: (a)type of
actions; (b)successful measures.
The cost related to indirect actions are described as follows (fig. 8.15):
• Type 1- according to the type of medical unit used (shelter or tent) differ-
ent cost are assessed as reported in chapter 4. With regard the OSMA case
study, a total cost of 1.660.000€ and 892.000€ is estimated for shelter and tent
installation respectively.
• Type 2 – according to chapter 4, the estimated cost for the aerial evacuation of
patients is estimated in 10.000€/h, which under the hypothesis of considering
only the acute phase of the medical response emergency (first 10 hours), makes
the final cost of 100.000€.
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Figure 8.15.: Indirect actions cost for successful mitigation:(a)HTCI and (b)HPI.
8.3. Santa Clara Valley Medical Center (US)
In the following part, the risk mitigation analysis regarding the Santa Clara Valley
Medical Center will be described according to the seismic event with seismic intensity
I=8. The analysis of the current hospital performance vulnerability is reported in
figure 8.16.
Figures 8.16a and 8.16b show the day time current levels for the HTC and IS re-
spectively. The HTCTARGET (HTC = HTDHOSPITAL=1.3) is not currently reached
and only the half of the medical demand is successfully coped while for the ISSCVMC,
a 30% of the whole hospital areas are unsecure.
8.3.1. Direct Actions
Figure 8.17 shows the risk mitigation analysis carried out on IS by the application
of the direct actions described in chapter 4. Since the night and day time scenario
have the same trends, only the day time scenario will be shown next.
Figure 8.17a reports the simulation according to type 2 actions. Appreciable im-
provements are detectable for seismic intensities I=5-7 with respect the current
situation where the simulated IS could give 90% secure areas. For intensity I=8 the
intrinsic security is 80% (10% more than the current value). Finally, for I=9, the
simulated IS decreases at 70% and to the minimum value of 60% for intensity I=10.
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Figure 8.16.: SCVMC performance assessment: (a) HTC and (b) IS.
The application of type 3 actions is reported in figure 8.17b. It shows for I=5-7 an
improved value with respect to type 2 actions while for intensity I=8 the levels are
similar. For type 4 measures, figure 8.17c reports how there are no mitigation effects
for the day scenario. The night/holidays scenario gets the same IS trend than the
current day time one. Finally, figure 8.17d shows how type 5 structural retrofitting
reports some appreciable effects only at the highest intensities I=8-10.
Figure 8.18 shows the comparison between IS on applying the non-structural actions
‘NS’ (type 2 and 3 actions) and the non-structural plus the structural measure
‘NS+S’. Similar improvements are estimated for both strategies at the seismic range
I=5-7 where secure areas are almost the 100% of the whole hospital. For intensity
I=8 the structural contribution provides a 5% higher value with respect to the
NS strategy: IS=0.9 for NS and IS=0.95 for NS+S. For I=9, the simulated values
maintain the same relative differences (ISNS=0.76, ISNS+S=0.8 and ISCURRENT= 0.7)
while for I=10, the structural contribution provides a 10% higher IS with respect
to the ‘NS’ strategy and almost 100% with regards to the current IS (ISNS=0.68,
ISNS+S=0.8 and ISCURRENT =0.46).
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Figure 8.17.: SCVMC risk reduction results on IS according to the retrofitting
type for direct actions.
Figure 8.18.: SCVMC risk reduction results on IS according to the retrofitting
strategies ‘NS’ and ‘NS+S’.
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With regards to the HTC, figure 8.19a shows the comparison between the current
situation and the simulation according the type 2 actions for the day scenario. It
shows appreciable improvements for the seismic intensities I= 5-7 (+1.03) while for
highest intensities the improvements are lower but still perceptible with a medium
increase of 0.25.
Moreover, figure 8.19b shows the effects of the type 3 actions. The simulated im-
provement of for intensities I=5-7 is about of 214% with respect to the current
situation while lower but still high improvements are observed for the seismic inten-
sity I=8 – 10 which shows an increase of 167% for magnitude I=8 and 121% for I=9
-10.
No improvements are registered for the day time HTC according to type 4 actions
(figure 8.19c) while figure 8.19d shows the effects of the structural retrofitting (type
5 actions) and reports appreciable improvements with respect to the current values
estimated for the intensity I=10 (+21%).
Figure 8.19.: SCVMC risk reduction results on HTC according to the retrofitting
type for direct actions.
Figure 8.20 shows the effects of mitigation strategies ‘NS’ (type 2+ type 3 actions)
and ‘S+NS’ (type 2+ type 3 + type 5 actions) on HTC. The only difference existing
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between the two strategies is only appreciable for intensity I=10 which reports an
improvement with respect of the current situation of 280% for ‘NS+S’ and 223% for
‘NS’. For all the other seismic intensities (I=3-9) both simulations show similar val-
ues. For the seismic range I=5-7, the simulated value is constant (HTC=6.0) while
for I=8-9 a 223% improvement is estimated with respect to the current situation.
The structural retrofitting for the US case study permits to improve the HTC only
for the highest seismic intensity I=10 by showing a 20% improvement with re-
spect to ‘NS’ mitigation. Moreover, the smaller impact of structural retrofitting
for HTCSCVMC than for ISSCVMC is justified by the location of the surgical area
which is entirely situated in a steel moment resistant building while the inpatients
wards are shared between a steel building and the old wing area built before 1980.
Figure 8.20.: SCVMC risk reduction results on HTC according to the retrofitting
strategies ‘NS’ and ‘NS+S’.
With regards to the SCVMC response to the impact, figure 8.21 shows the current
HTCI pre- and post-event (I=8) degradation for the day scenario. The pre-event
HTCI (4.67) is reduced to the HTCI=0.52 which is not enough for a successful
medical response of the health structure.
Figure 8.21.: HTCI reduction due to seismic impact at SCVMC.
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Next, as well as done for the IS, the effects of the different mitigation actions on
HTCI are reported for both day and night/holidays scenarios.
Figure 8.22a shows the effects by applying type 2 actions. A 46% improvement has
been assessed for both day and time scenario while the effects of simulating the type
3 actions provides a 165% improvement for both day and night scenario with respect
the current situation, see figure 8.22b. Figure 8.22c shows the effects by applying
the type 4 measures. No improvements are estimated for the day scenario while for
the night one a 868% improvement has been assessed (HTCINIGHT=0.53). Finally
figure 8.22d reports the effects of type 5 actions. No appreciable improvements have
been assessed for the seismic level I=8 for both day and night scenario.
Figure 8.22.: SCVMC risk reduction results on HTCI according to the retrofitting
type for direct actions.
Figure 8.23 shows the comparison between the simulated retrofitting of non-structural
‘NS’ strategy and “non-structural and structural actions” (NS+S) with respect to
the current situation. The HTCITARGET for successfully coping with the medical
demand in the aftermath of an earthquake (I=8) is obtained by both strategies (NS
and NS+S). The structural retrofitting is unnecessary for a seismic intensity I=8
event.
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Figure 8.23.: HTCI risk reduction according to retrofitting strategies ‘NS’ and
‘NS+S’.
Figure 8.24 shows the results of simulating the retrofitting actions defined above.
Figure 8.24.: SCVMC risk reduction results on HPI according to the retrofitting
type for direct actions.
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According to the current HPI, the mitigation aim for both scenarios day and night
is providing HPIEXTRA=0.47 and HPIEXTRA=0.91 respectively. In other words, the
goal is keeping the maximum acceptable HPI loss within the value 2.21 (HPIpre-event-
HPITARGET).
Figure 8.24a simulates the effects of seismic retrofitting with type 2 actions. With
regards to the current HPI, improvements of 45% and 37.5% have been assessed
for both day and night/holidays scenarios respectively. Figure 8.24b reports the
type 3 retrofitting simulation. Improvements of 158% and 112% with respect to the
current HPI have been estimated for both day and night/holidays time scenarios
respectively. Figure 8.24c shows the effects on type 4 actions. No improvements are
estimated for the day scenario while for the night scenario a 562% upgrade has been
evaluated. Finally figure 8.24d reports the simulation with the type 5 retrofitting
which shows light improvements with respect to the current situation: 2% and 12%
for day and night scenarios respectively.
Figure 8.25 shows the comparison between non-structural (NS) and the structural
plus non-structural (S+NS) strategies with respect to the current situation. Both
seismic scenarios have been analyzed without taking into consideration the type 4
actions. For the day scenario structural retrofitting are unnecessary for reaching the
HPITARGET at the level I=8 since the total improvement obtained with NS strategy
for daytime provides with a simulated HPI= 1.65 (+215%). For the night scenario,
although the simulation results for both strategies show improvements with respect
to the current one, the HPITARGET is far away to be obtained.
Figure 8.25.: SCVMC risk reduction results on HPI according to the retrofitting
strategies ‘NS’ and ‘NS+S’.
8.3.2. Indirect Actions
The results of seismic risk mitigation with the use of indirect actions are reported
as follows. The current HTCI (0.52) means that only half of the medical demand
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can be satisfied and in order to get the HTCITARGET, indirect interventions must
guarantee improvements able to get an extra HPI of 0.48. This corresponds to a
HTCEXTRA=0.63 (HTC=HTDHOSPITAL).
According to the immediate post-event phase, 1.5 extra surgery tables are necessary
for an appropriate hospital response. Because of the fact that it is not possible
providing with 1.5 extra surgery tables, figure 8.26 shows the retrofitting scenario
obtained with 2 extra surgery tables. Moreover, figure 8.26 reports the mitigation
effects obtained by the use of aerial medical evacuation which is estimated in 1
patient per hour.
Figure 8.26.: SCVMC hospital risk reduction with the application of indirect ac-
tions (HTCI).
Regarding the intrinsic security (IS), no indirect intervention can improve it because
this index evaluates the security within the hospital before the event.
Finally the post mitigation HPI is reported in figure 8.27. The compliance with
the HPITARGET is due to the fact that both the type 1 and type 2 indirect actions
were chosen bigger than the ones suggested by the mathematical calculations (2
tables instead of 1.5 and 1 patient evacuated per hour instead of 0.5). The use of
precise values beside the impossibility to operate on the intrinsic security through
the indirect interventions would have given a post mitigation HPI=0.96.
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Figure 8.27.: SCVMC hospital risk reduction with the application of indirect ac-
tions (HPI).
The cost assessment for indirect actions can be assumed null for the hospital decision
makers with respect of the direct interventions because the interventions are carried
out by other civil and military institutions involved in the medical response chain
(chapter 1).
On the other hand, the indirect actions have some negative points such as the trans-
portation of the mobile medical units which can’t be carried out when the road
viability is damaged. This could be possible when after an earthquake for geolog-
ical, structural and mass sociologic reasons. Moreover, the mandatory presence of
available and undamaged airstrip for airplane and helicopters could make the use of
aerial evacuations unavailable.
Finally, the application of indirect measures for the seismic risk mitigation reports ef-
ficiency related problem. Even if the HTCI can reach the appropriate HTCITARGET,
the time necessary to activate a mobile medical unit or the time necessary to the
aerial evacuation, which must be quantified as 2 patients every hour, could have
significative delays which can be estimated around 10 hours for fields hospital in-
stallation to a couple of hours for medical units (tents or shelters) [101].
8.3.3. Cost Assessment
The costs related to the interventions listed above were estimated by taking into
account the analysis in 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 and contextualized to the SCVMC case. The
estimations according to the direct interventions are reported in figure 8.28 and 8.29
as follows:
• Type 2 and type 3 actions - the interventions pertain to both the techni-
cal installations (functional elements anchorage and the inclusion of flexible
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connections) and medical equipment (anchorage of medical devices). From a
point of view of the technical plants, the whole SCVMC area must be consid-
ered (68.000 m2). The estimated total cost of type 3 actions is approximately
170.000€. For type 2 actions cost estimation, the following operating proce-
dure was applied:
1. Definition of the medical equipment with high-priority of anchorage ac-
cording to chapter 4.1;
2. Field inspection and personnel interviews for the anchorage evaluation
of high priority anchorage medical equipment. From the analysis, some
technologies were not properly anchored to the ground, see table 8.1.
Unfortunately, it was not possible to obtain the technology database of
SCVMC, so in order to have the total numbers at the SCVMC, a projec-
tion on the whole number of medical device according to the technology
proportions of OSMA hospital was chosen. The estimated number of de-
vices which need to be fixed is 88, which corresponds to an expected cost
of 13.000€.
High priority anchorage technology unfixed to the floor
ANAESTHESIA SYSTEM
ULTRASOUND DEVICE
ELECTRO SURGICAL INSTRUMENT
INCUBATOR
Table 8.1.: Unfixed technologies found at the SCVMC.
• Type 4 actions – the same procedure as for the OSMA hospital has been
followed which shows an estimated cost of 180.000€, see paragraph 8.1.3.
• Type 5 - as reported in paragraphs 4.3.1 and 4.3.2, the structural interventions
are estimated for a total cost of 200 €/m2. Although the total surface area
of the SCVMC is 68.000m2, the cost estimation of the structural retrofitting
can be evaluated by considering only the buildings "b" and "c" which contain
the medical areas essential to the performance and response (44.826m2) and
evaluated as approximately 9.000.000€ (44.826m2 * 200 €/m2 = 8.965.200€),
see figure 8.28.
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Figure 8.28.: Direct actions costs for IS and HTCI according to: (a)type of actions
(HTCI); (b)type of actions (IS); (c)successful actions (HTCITARGET); (d)successful
actions (ISTARGET).
Figure 8.29.: Direct intervention costs related to HPISSCVMCaccording to: (a)type
of actions; (b)successful measures.
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The cost related to the indirect intervention are described as follows, see figure 8.30:
• Type 1- according to the type of medical unit used (shelter or tent) different
cost are assessed as reported in chapter 4. With regards the SCVMC case
study, a total cost of 678.000€ and 446.000€ are estimated for shelter and tent
installation respectively;
• Type 2 – according to chapter 4, an estimated cost for the aerial evacuation
of patients can be estimated in 5.000€/h, which is in total 50.000€ according
to the hypothesis of considering only the acute phase of the medical response
emergency (first 10 hours).
Figure 8.30.: Indirect intervention costs for successful mitigation related to
(a)HTCISCVMC and (b)HPISCVMC.
8.4. OSMA - SCVMC Comparison
Both OSMA hospital and SCVMC direct actions are able to get the HPITARGET for
the risk mitigation. The structural interventions (Florence at I=6 and US at I=8)
do not provide any further improvements to the simulated HPI obtained with the
application of only non-structural interventions, see figure 8.31.
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Figure 8.31.: HTCI comparison between the OSMA hospital and SCVMC case
studies.
Moreover, within the non-structural interventions, type 3 actions are the most ef-
fective for the risk reduction in both hospitals, see figure 8.32 even if they are not
enough to get HTCITARGET at OSMA hospital. It can be only obtained by the simul-
taneous application of both type 3 and type 2 actions. Because of the high difference
in the hospitals areas (about 5.000m2 for OSMA and 68.000m2 for SCVMC), despite
the necessity of more interventions for OSMA the cost for US mitigation are esti-
mated much more expensive than for the Florentine hospital: 170.000€ for SCVMC
and 30.000€ for OSMA hospital.
Figure 8.32.: Retrofitting effects on HTCI by applying type 3 actions to both
OSMA hospital and SCVMC.
Regarding the HPI post mitigation, in both case studies the direct mitigation in-
terventions are able to get the HPITARGET, see figure 8.33. As well as for the
HTCI, structural interventions do not provide appreciable further improvements to
the OSMA and SCVMC hospitals with respect to the application of non-structural
interventions only.
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Figure 8.33.: HPI comparison between the OSMA hospital and SCVMC.
As reported for the HTCI comparison, the HPI analysis shows how basic installa-
tion retrofitting is enough to obtain appropriate seismic risk mitigation for the US
case study while for the Italian application both the equipment and basic installa-
tion retrofitting actions are necessary to reduce the seismic risk (I=6). Moreover,
HTCITARGET and HPITARGET can’t be reached for the night scenarios in both ap-
plications. Only the simultaneous intervention of types 3-4 for US and types 2-3-4
actions for OSMA, will be effective to get the HPITARGET and HTCITARGET in the
night/holidays.
Finally, with regards to the indirect mitigation procedure, figure 8.34 reports both
applications to the Italian and US case studies.
Figure 8.34.: HPI comparison between indirect interventions at both the OSMA
hospital and SCVMC.
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Less external facilities and medical evacuation of patients are essential in order to
get the HPITARGET at the SCVMC compared to the Italian study: 2 extra surgery
tables and 1 patient/h aerial evacuation are half of the total support necessary to
OSMA. Moreover, the application of indirect interventions for the risk mitigation
of the US hospital is cheaper than the OSMA hospital in Florence, see figure 8.35.
The cost of indirect interventions for HTCI are similar to those for HPI.
Figure 8.35.: HTCI (or HPI) cost analysis of indirect actions application to OSMA
hospital and SCVMC.
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9.1. Overview
This last chapter describes the development of an informative prototype of a De-
cision Support System (DSS) for carrying out seismic assessment and mitigation
simulations within health structures. An efficient risk mitigation model is the one
which is usually apply from stakeholders. Usability aspects are essential for provid-
ing important information to the decision makers which must be immediate, fast
and clear in order to properly support the decisions.
9.2. Risk Technology as Risk Dissemination
In chapter 2, ISO 31000:2009 states that the communication of risk essential to fully
understand the risk connection with the context, communication and consultation
with internal and external stakeholders. Moreover, within the communication of risk
different steps and stages are defined as the phase of support for a treatment plan.
An appropriate risk management method is given when the responsible decision
makers are basing their decision on the model itself. Communication to the decision
level and developing supporting tools/instruments become essential for the whole
risk mitigation methodology. For this reason technology should be applied for the
development of this tool by providing the most friendly and accurate systems.
The basic ideas which are at the base of the following DSS are usability [103] and
clearness of the information and simulation approach.
Usability is important to guarantee the use of the system by the decision maker
which gets a good feedback and perception in the system application. Clearness
of the information is extremely important in complex system’s analysis because
of the presence of numerous data and statistics which make the decision step really
confusing. Choosing a few but important information according to a priority scale is
essential to the decision effectiveness and rapidity. Lastly, the simulation approach is
fundamental to the decision makers to easily compare and understand the simulated
effects of different choices and scenarios, especially for complex systems such as
hospitals where the effects of an intervention in a specific part of the system is
difficult to be predicted.
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9.3. DSS Prototype
The aim of prototyping an informative system such as the DSS resides in the techni-
cal specification provision as well as the functional and logic structure of the system
beside the user interface (essential for the usability aspect) and the accesses’ (per-
missions, privacy and login-logout) polices.
In the next section the prototyping aspects of the DSS for risk management in
hospitals will be described especially with regards to the functional and logical
structure, the accesses policy and the user interface development. The technical
specifications are not deeply analyzed here since they strongly depend on the type
of programming language used for the system implementation such as java, php,
asp, c++, visual basic etc.
9.3.1. Software Mock-up as Technology Prototyping
Software prototyping is mainly based on two major types of prototyping: Throwaway
Prototyping and Evolutionary Prototyping [102].
Rapid prototyping
The throwaway prototyping or Rapid Prototyping refers to the working model of the
system which is mainly developed to visually show the users what their requirements
may look like when they are implemented into a finished system.
Advantages in using a rapid prototyping are the rapidity, the efficiency and the cost-
effectiveness of the informative system validation in terms of quality suggestions for
functional and usability software requirements.
Evolutionary prototyping
The Evolutionary Prototyping’s main goal is to build a very robust prototype in a
structured manner and constantly refine it. This approach allows the development
of new features which couldn’t be conceived at the design phase.
Moreover, although this method takes long in the whole application process from a
technical point of view it only takes into consideration already functional systems
which can be used as important basis for the final product.
Mock-up and Prototype
According to the ISO technical report ISO/IEC TR 14759:1999 (Information tech-
nology - software engineering: Mock up and prototype, a categorization of software
mock up and prototype models and their use) [104], mock up and prototypes are
technical terms which are different but commonly confused. A software mock up can
be defined as a provisional product that cannot be used by users neither intended
to evolve into a fully operational product (verification, training and recording aims)
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while a software "prototype" represents already a part of the target product which
may evolve into an operational product.
As reported by the ISO/IEC technical report [104] it is important to make an addi-
tional distinction on software prototyping methods according to the specific features
of software aims:
• Illustrative - related to realistic graphic representation (Human Computer in-
terface);
• Functional - capable of performing computations.
Moreover, the prototype development is essential for reducing risks of critical projects
such as the supporting tools for decision making process in risk management for
healthcare [104-106].
The mock up makes part of the rapid prototyping techniques and it does not provide
a real version but a realistic version of the target product which is characterized by
the following features [104]:
• Not all features of the target product need be represented;
• The development environment (machine, language, and tools) need not be
that of the target product but it must be representative of the target product;
• The operating environment technical components need not be those of the
target product but they must be representative of the target product;
• It is acceptable to use a subset of the documentation normally used to docu-
ment the full development life cycle.
9.3.2. Description of the System
A HTML based software has been used for developing a demonstrative functional
mock up (typical for rapid prototyping) in order to show the functional organization
of a seismic risk management decision support system for hospitals.
The DSS, based on the methodology and models reported in the previous chapters,
is showed in figure 9.1 and based on three main functions: new project and open
projects for the users and the database management for the system administrator.
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Figure 9.1.: Homepage belonging to the mock-up of the seismic risk management
in hospital DSS ‘SIRIO’.
The seismic risk management applied to hospitals consists of three activities, the
vulnerability assessment, the risk analysis and the risk mitigation. The choice of
one of this assessment is requested once an old projects is open either when a new
project is named, see figure 9.2.
Figure 9.2.: SIRIO DSS – the risk management activities.
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For the seismic vulnerability assessment, included as first step in all the other ac-
tivities, the data inserting includes, besides the general info, the structural aspects
(figure 9.3a) and non-structural data (figure 9.3b). Within the no-structural data,
the following technical systems are reported: medical gas, power distribution, fire
system, plumbing infrastructure, medical equipment, hospital IT, internal viability
and external accessibility, air system and administrative/organizational.
Figure 9.3.: SIRIO DSSS - Data inserting forms.
For the risk analysis data and information on the seismic scenario are requested. In
fact figure 9.4 reports the data input form which defines as necessary information
the expected seismic magnitude, number of local hospitals and number of expected
injuries.
Figure 9.4.: SIRIO DSS – risk analysis form.
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With regards to the risk mitigation phase, the DSS gives two possible interventions:
direct and indirect ones. A list of each possible action belonging to the type of
interventions is reported for both categories, see figure 9.5.
The results are expressesed by showing both the estimated situation according to
the current collected data and the simulated one which includes the retrofitting cost
as well.
Figure 9.5.: SIRIO DSS – the risk mitigation page: direct and indirect
interventions.
Finally figure 9.6a and 9.6b show the model when “open a project” or “my Database”
action is chosen respectively. While for the “open a project” action the user is allowed
to open, delete or edit the different saved projects, for the DB management only
the system administrator is allowed to enter through a protected login asking for
username and password. The possible actions permitted in the DB management
section are the modification of the structure/data of each project and the extraction
of the DB containing the hospital and scenario data inserted by the users.
Figure 9.6.: SIRIO DSS – (a)open a project form; (b)front end section for the DB
management.
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10. Conclusions and Further
Developments
Local hospital response is one of the essential key points of the medical response
to an earthquake. According to the international state of art of risk management
in hospitals, the methodology proposed by this work consists of an integration of
typical approaches: the rapid vulnerability assessment and the critical infrastructure
modeling.
This allows a complete analysis of structural, non-structural (including the new
forms for the fire safety and medical equipment vulnerability assessment), organiza-
tional aspects and their connections within the complex system given by the health
facility, all of which are indispensable to guarantee an efficient and safe response by
hospitals.
Moreover, a new index of intrinsic security (IS) is defined alongside the hospital
treatment capacity (HTC) which allows the evaluation of both the strategic and
sheltering function of health structures while the new Hospital Performance Index
(HPI) summarizes the hospital response to the seismic impact on the local sce-
nario by the estimation of the expected medical demand and hospital performances
degradation.
Once the methodology has been developed, the application of a sensitivity analysis
shows that the Fault Tree Analysis approach provides a more reliable behavior and
more accurate outputs than the Leontief model, as observed in the methodology
validation at the main hospital during L’Aquila earthquake (Ospedale San Salvatore,
April 6, 2009).
The risk mitigation in Italy (OSMA hospital) and in US (SCV Medical Center)
shows similarities and interesting differences. For both cases structural retrofitting is
unnecessary for the risk reduction and the seismic risk is higher for the night/holidays
scenario since the effective performance of the medical personnel, which is mostly
available on call, may depend on their housing resilience and the availability of road
viability during earthquakes.
The main differences result from the non-structural retrofitting actions. Basic in-
stallation elements’ anchorage is enough for an appropriate hospital response in the
US case study while for the Italian one this must be added to further anchorage of
the medical equipment. Moreover, the use of indirect interventions (installation of
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mobile medical units and aerial medical evacuation) is estimated to be half demand
for the Californian hospital compared to the Florentine facility.
Although fewer interventions are required for the US hospital, the estimated cost
are evaluated as much higher than the Italian hospital. This is due to the different
sizes of the facilities (70.000m2for the SCVMC and 5.000m2for OSMA hospital in
Italy).
Finally the prototyping process for developing the informative decision support sys-
tem (DSS) has been carried out in order to improve the dissemination of the method-
ology and aims to provide the usability and functional specifications essential for
hospital risk management DSS.
Further developments are needed to analyse the other elements involved in the medi-
cal response in aftermath of earthquake such as the building structural resilience, the
road net infrastructure analysis and evaluation on the rescue and search activities.
Finally the simulation oriented approach of the model could also be applied by the
civil protection decision makers for planning (and optimizing resources) a synergic
and systemic risk management response which could include all the local hospitals’
response according to the specific characteristic of each medical facility.
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